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NO VIRTUE IN PASSIVITY: THE SUPREME
COURT AND ALI AL-MARRI
BRUCE MILLER*
INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2009, the Obama administration announced a plan
to issue an executive order authorizing the indefinite detention
without trial of non-citizens suspected of terrorism.1 This proposal
followed and expanded on the President’s May 21, 2009 speech, de
livered at the National Archives, in which he argued that protecting
national security required a non-criminal detention system for per
sons who cannot be successfully prosecuted but are, in the view of
the Executive Branch, too dangerous to release.2 The Administra
* Professor of law, Western New England University School of Law; AB, Stan
ford University; JD, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Thomas DeBose, J.D. West
ern New England University School of Law, 2010 and member of the Massachusetts
Bar, for his exceptional research and editorial help and, even more, for his insights into
the difficult questions raised by our nation’s anti-terrorism detention policies. The ar
gument made in this piece owes much to Mr. DeBose’s clear thinking and balanced
judgment. Thanks also to the Editorial Board and staff of the Western New England
Law Review for consistently helpful comments, questions, and suggestions and for un
erring technical support.
1. Dafna Linzer & Peter Finn, White House Weighs Order on Detention, WASH.
POST, June 27, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/26/
AR2009062603361.html.
2. President Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the Pres
ident on National Security at the National Archives (May 21, 2009), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National
Security-5-21-09/; see Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Would Move Some Detainees to
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/us/politics/
22obama.html.
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tion’s plan appeared to be based on the same broad and controver
sial claims of Presidential power asserted by Mr. Obama’s
predecessor, George W. Bush. The President’s announcement in
cluded few details. It failed to define the classes of persons subject
to detention or to specify the institutions, civilian or military, execu
tive or judicial, that would be authorized to order a detention. Nor
did the proposal address the evidence needed to justify particular
detentions, the rights of potential detainees to see and challenge
such evidence—especially if it has been classified, or the extent to
which detention proceedings would be public. Then, on July 21, a
task force appointed by the President to make recommendations
regarding the fates of prisoners held at the U.S. Naval base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba issued an interim report recommending
continued indefinite detention of some of these prisoners, but also
the establishment of a “durable and effective” framework for hold
ing future detainees captured in the fight against terrorists.3
The President’s task force elaborated on this recommendation
on January 22, 2010, when it issued its final, case-by-case, review of
the status of the then approximately 240 prisoners remaining in mil
itary detention at Guantanamo.4 The review concluded that these
detainees should be divided into three groups. About thirty-five
prisoners would be prosecuted for alleged crimes, leaving the ques
tion of whether the venue for these prosecutions should be civilian
or military courts unresolved.5 Another one hundred and ten pris
oners would be entitled to release, some as soon as possible, and
others eventually, on the ground that there was no lawful basis for
the United States military to continue detaining them.6 Thirty
members of this second group, however, were Yemeni nationals,
and the Obama Administration had barred the repatriation of any
detainees to Yemen.7 The Administration imposed this prohibition
because of its belief that an apparent attempt by a young Nigerian
3. Glen Greenwald, First Steps Taken to Implement Preventive Detention, Military
Commissions, SALON.COM (July 21, 2009) http://salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/07/
21/detention/.
4. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE
1, 7-8 (2009) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], available at http://media.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/GTMOtaskforcereport_052810.pdf; see also Charlie Savage, De
tainees Will Still Be Held, But Not Tried, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22gitmo.html.
5. Peter Finn, Justice Task Force Recommends About 50 Guantanamo Detainees
Be Held Indefinitely, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
dyn/content/article/2010/01/21/AR2010012104936_pf.html.
6. Id.; Savage, supra note 4.
7. Finn, supra note 5.
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man to blow up a civilian airliner landing in Detroit on Christmas
Day in 2009 was the fruit of a plot that originated in Yemen.8
The third category of military prisoners held at Guantanamo,
numbering about fifty, constituted of men who were, the review
concluded, subject to indefinite detention “without trial under the
laws of war.”9 Obama administration officials acknowledged that
these prisoners were entitled to use the privilege of habeas corpus
to challenge their incarceration in federal court, but did not other
wise recommend specific standards or procedures to govern the ad
judication of these challenges.10
On the same day that the President’s Task Force released its
final report, three United States District Court judges assigned
habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of Guantanamo detainees
expressed a good deal of confusion and consternation about how
these petitions should proceed. One of them, Chief Judge Royce
Lamberth, emphasized both the high stakes at issue in these cases
and his marked frustration about the absence of any clarity about
how to go about resolving them: “[We] are struggling ‘to adapt legal
principles to a whole new sphere of human existence that we’ve
never witnessed in history as far as I know.’”11
Chief Judge Lamberth, along with Judges Reggie Walton and
Ricardo Urbina, described the problems they faced as stemming
from a “battle against terrorist groups [that] doesn’t fit the classic
definition of war, with clearly defined enemies who would be re
leased when the conflict was settled.”12 As captives held in a war
“without end, terroris[t] detainees,” the Judges pointed out, “could
be locked up for life.”13 At the same time, they emphasized, “the
risk in ordering a detainee to be released seems much greater than
in past conflicts, because a return to the battlefield is not just a re
turn to traditional frontlines, but to possible attacks on civilians.”14
“‘How confident can I be,’” Chief Judge Lamberth lamented, strik
ing a tone as understandable as it may be apocalyptic, “‘that if I
8. Id.; Savage, supra note 4.
9. Finn, supra note 5.
10. Id.
11. Chisun Lee, Judges Urge Congress to Act on Indefinite Terrorism Detentions,
ON THE HILL BLOG (Jan. 22, 2010), http://onthehillblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/judges
urge-congress-to-act-on.html (quoting Chief Judge Royce Lamberth).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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make the wrong choice that he won’t be the one that blows up the
Washington Monument or the Capitol?’”15
A Brookings Institution report,16 also issued on January 22,
evinced a good deal of sympathy for the situation facing the Guan
tanamo habeas corpus judges.17 The Report, co-authored by
Brookings Fellows Benjamin Wittes and Rabea Benhalim, and Uni
versity of Texas Law Professor Robert M. Chesney, lamented the
absence of any helpful sources of law defining (or limiting) the
President’s military detention authority or establishing procedures
applicable in federal court to such detention.18 As a consequence,
according to these scholars, the judges’ dispositions of these chal
lenges have produced an array of incompatible approaches to these
important questions.19
As the Justice Department, federal judges, and thoughtful aca
demic commentators underscored the continuing uncertainty sur
rounding the legal status and rights of persons apprehended in the
United States’ efforts to combat terrorism, other events during the
winter and spring of 2009-2010 illustrated some of the practical ef
fects of this uncertainty. The decision of the Obama Administra
tion to prosecute the alleged Christmas Day airplane bomber
criminally rather than to remand him to military custody was se
verely criticized by proponents of military detention. Senators Jo
seph Lieberman and Susan Collins claimed that treating this
suspect “as a criminal rather than [as] a UEB [Unprivileged Enemy
Belligerent] almost certainly prevented the military . . . from ob
taining information that would have been critical . . . to preventing
future attacks.”20 Senator Collins added that in her view the Con
stitution offered no protection to the alleged bomber because he
was not a U.S. citizen and had no previous connection with the

15.
16.

Id. (quoting Chief Judge Royce Lamberth).
BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, THE EMERGING
LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2010), avail
able at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_
wittes_chesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf.
17. See Lyle Denniston, Commentary: A GTMO Anniversary, and a New Debate,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/commentary-a
gtmo-anniversary-and-a-new-debate/.
18. Id.; see also WITTES ET AL., supra note 16, at 1-3.
19. Denniston, supra note 17; see also WITTES ET AL., supra note 16, at 35-59.
20. Kasie Hunt, Lieberman Rips FBI on Miranda Rights, POLITICO (Jan. 25,
2010), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/31969.html.
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United States until his entry into the country on the airliner he was
charged with attempting to destroy.21
Similar criticism was leveled against Attorney General Eric
Holder’s decision to prosecute Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, often
described as the chief planner of the September 11, 2001 attacks on
the United States, in a federal district court rather than before a
military court convened outside the United States.22 “Andrew McCarthy, [a] former Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney who led the pros
ecution of the 1993 World Trade Center attacks,” maintained that
the Attorney General “didn’t ‘understand what [the] rule of law has
always been in wartime. . . . It’s military commissions. It’s not to
wrap our enemies in our Bill of Rights.’”23 The proposed prosecu
tion of Mohammed in Manhattan was also questioned by Demo
cratic Senators Dianne Feinstein and Charles Schumer and by New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg.24 In February of 2010, Sena
tor Lindsey Graham introduced a bill to preclude the expenditures
of federal funds for civilian prosecutions of any crimes related to
the events of September 11.25
The spring of 2010 also brought reports from senior officials
that the Obama Administration, despite some internal dissent, was
on the verge of issuing regulations authorizing the indefinite deten
tion without trial at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan of at least
some persons believed by the Administration to be terrorists.26
And in an address to the American Society of International Law
delivered on March 29, 2010, Harold Koh, legal advisor to the State
Department, maintained that the President had legal authority to
indefinitely detain non-state actors without trial, at either Guanta
namo or Bagram, if they met the Administration’s legal definition
of “enemy belligerent.”27
21. Glenn Greenwald, Susan Collins Spreads Central Myth About the Constitu
tion, SALON.COM (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/
2010/02/01/collins.
22. See Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/
02/15/100215fa_fact_mayer#ixzz0f3AOFd5E.
23. Id. (quoting former Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew McCarthy).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. David S. Cloud & Julian E. Barnes, New Rules on Terror Custody Being
Drafted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/15/nation/la-na
obama-detention16-2010apr16.
27. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama Admin
istration and International Law, Address to Annual Meeting of the American Society
of International Law, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE301.txt

702

unknown

Seq: 6

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

30-SEP-11

8:12

[Vol. 33:697

Finally, in March of 2011, the Obama Administration issued an
executive order announcing the continued indefinite detention,
without trial, of the 172 prisoners then still held at Guantanamo.28
A month later, Attorney General Holder, by then facing a statutory
ban on any transfer of prisoners from Guantanamo to the United
States, even for the purpose of prosecution in civilian courts, an
nounced that Khalid Sheik Muhammed and four other Guanta
namo detainees would be prosecuted in military commissions
convened at the naval base instead of the federal district court in
Manhattan, as originally planned.29
It is evident that more than eight years after September 11,
2001, the day on which the attention of American political and legal
institutions were riveted to the array of problems posed by terrorist
violence, the scope and limits of the President’s military detention
power remain largely unsettled. In significant part, this uncertainty
can be traced to the Supreme Court. Despite deciding five signifi
cant cases challenging Bush Administration policies concerning
“enemy combatant” detainees since 2004, the Court has provided
almost no guidance, as to either the President’s authority to adopt a
preventive detention scheme of the sort outlined by President
Obama and his task force, or to the principles, if any, that might
govern or constrain its implementation.30 The Court’s dispositions
of these cases reveal very little about the Justices’ views on the
questions raised by the Administration’s plans to introduce a per
manent system of preventive detention. With respect to both the
assertion of executive power such a program would entail, and the
equally important specifics the President has not yet filled in, the
Court has left ample room for almost any answer.
To be sure, the Court’s “enemy combatant” decisions, all but
one resolved at least in part against the executive branch, have lim
ited presidential authority in some respects. And the Justices’ reti
releases/remarks/139119.htm. Mr. Koh stated that the legal standard for determining
whether a detainee was an enemy belligerent “includes, but is not limited to, whether
an individual joined with or became part of al-Qaeda or Taliban forces or associated
forces, which can be demonstrated by relevant evidence of formal or functional mem
bership, which may include an oath of loyalty, training with al-Qaeda, or taking posi
tions with enemy forces.” Id.
28. Executive Order: Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay
Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force, WHITEHOUSE.
GOV (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/executive
order-periodic-review-individuals-detained-guant-namo-bay-nava.
29. Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9-11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/us/05gitmo.html?.
30. See discussion infra notes 31-61.
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cence on the issues of great moment raised by the Bush (and now
Obama) Administration’s claims of power to effect indefinite de
tention without trial is consistent with a conception of judicial mod
esty that is time honored, widely endorsed, and recently
reinvigorated by contemporary champions of judicial minimalism.31
This restrained conception of the judicial role was perhaps most ef
fectively stated and defended almost half a century ago by Alexan
der Bickel.32 Professor Bickel’s justly famous essay extols the
“passive virtues” of various judge-made strategies and techniques
for avoiding resolution of constitutional questions, especially those
that are both controversial and significant.33 He links the legiti
macy of the Supreme Court’s authority to impose its view of “what
the law is” on a congress or President that may strongly disagree
with a deliberate commitment by the Court to keep the expressions
of such authority to an absolutely necessary minimum.34
Some of the methods of limiting conflict between the courts
and the elected branches are familiar tools of the craft of adjudica
tion, such as addressing only those questions that must be resolved
in order to decide the case at hand; resolving these questions on the
narrowest available ground; leaving maximum space for the exer
cise of political judgment on issues of broad importance; and, wher
ever possible, relying on statutory, rather than constitutional,
sources of law as the basis for decision.35 The Supreme Court’s use
of these traditional techniques is in large part the reason the postSeptember 11 cases it has decided have shed so little light on the
President’s authority to effect non-criminal, preventive detention of
persons he believes are likely to engage in terrorism. The impact of
the Court’s restrained approach in these cases on the civil rights of
detainees, on the practical utility of constitutional limits in checking
presidential power, and even on the efficacy of rule of law values
31.

See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITU
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006) (arguing that that the judicial branch
has little, if any, legitimate role in checking anti-terrorism measures taken by the politi
cal branches in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (endorsing
the Supreme Court’s avoidance of broad statements of constitutional principle in favor
of decisions drawn on narrow grounds and making only incremental changes in settled
legal understandings).
32. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword:
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
33. Id. at 47-51.
34. See id. at 77-78.
35. See id. at 43-47 (describing judicial techniques that are employed by the
judiciary).
TION IN A

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE301.txt

704

unknown

Seq: 8

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

30-SEP-11

8:12

[Vol. 33:697

generally is a matter of considerable and justified controversy.36
But criticism of the Court on these consequential grounds, however
persuasive, is unlikely to dissuade the Justices from treading as cau
tiously and lightly as they can whenever they see themselves as con
strained by law to invalidate measures taken by the President in the
name of national security.
Professor Bickel’s argument was not primarily a defense of the
Supreme Court’s reliance on narrow grounds for decision in cases it
did resolve, though he surely did embrace that approach. Instead,
Bickel’s signal contribution was his justification of a series of judgemade strategies for avoiding resolution of the merits of controver
sial cases altogether.37 Bickel maintained that these strategies ena
bled the Court to defer resolution, especially of momentous
constitutional issues, to a time when political controversy surround
ing them has abated, making a principled rather than expedient de
cision more likely.38 His argument fostered and buttressed the
Supreme Court’s development of such “prudential” grounds for
non-decision as the political question doctrine, the generalized
grievance and third party bars to standing to sue, and the ripeness
and mootness limitations on otherwise justiciable cases.39 The doc
trines are prudential in two senses. First, they are designed by and
for judges, as self-limiting techniques, as opposed to being required
either by statute or the Constitution itself.40 And second, because
they are judge made, they may be invoked on a largely discretion
ary basis, at times and in ways that focus the exercise of judicial
36.

See generally JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESI
POWER (2006) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions invalidating the postSeptember 11 detention practices of the Bush Administration have had little impact on
the implementation of these practices); FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR. AND AZIZ Z.
HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR
(2007) (same); CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, EIGHT O’ CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD
SIDE: SEEKING JUSTICE AT GUANTANAMO BAY (2007) (pointing out the continuing
and often successful efforts of military and defense department officials to thwart
Guantanamo detainees’ access to counsel, even after the Supreme Court’s affirmation
of their right to such access). Contra JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN IN
SIDER’S ACCOUNT ON THE WAR ON TERROR (2006) (claiming that the President’s exec
utive and commander-in-chief powers are essentialy plenary and that his exercise of
these powers to prevent terrorism is not properly subject to judicial review).
37. Bickel, supra note 32, at 77-78.
38. Id. at 74-75.
39. Id. at 42-51.
40. Id. at 46 (“The political-question doctrine simply resists being domesticated in
this fashion. There is something different about it, in kind, not in degree, from the
general ‘interpretive process’; something greatly more flexible, something of prudence,
not construction and not principle.” (internal citations omitted)).
DENTIAL
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power less on the immediate remedial needs of the parties and
more on the Court’s institutional preference for rationing its ex
pressions of legal disagreement with the elected branches.41 The
Justices’ deliberate fashioning of techniques aimed at undermining
the obligatory character of judicial review is also justifiably contro
versial and arguably inconsistent with the notion of law as a con
straining force on courts as well as the political branches.42 But the
techniques themselves, for better or worse, are also now embedded
in our legal landscape.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s adoption of Bickel’s strat
egy of discretionary, selective passivity has not been unprincipled.
As elaborated by the Court’s decisions,43 the passive virtues have
their own limits. And with respect to the important questions
posed by the current and immediately previous Presidents’ execu
tion of their claimed power to detain terrorism suspects without
trial, the Supreme Court seriously violated those limits by deciding
not to resolve a case it had accepted for review in its 2008-2009
term. The case is Al-Marri v. Spagone, which the Court unjustifi
ably dismissed as moot on March 6, 2009.44 By dismissing this ap
peal, the Court ignored its duty to determine whether the military
detention of a non-citizen residing lawfully in the United States was
authorized by law. And that failure has in turn contributed signifi
cantly, and unnecessarily, to the cloud of legal uncertainty which
now hovers over the preventive detention measures adopted and
proposed by the Obama Administration.
I. THE AL-MARRI LITIGATION
A. Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri: Criminal Defendant, Enemy
Combatant, Criminal Defendant Redux
Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri is a citizen of Qatar.45 In the 1980s
and early 1990s, he studied computer science at Bradley University
in Peoria, Illinois, which awarded him a bachelor’s degree in 1991.46
41. Id. at 50-51.
42. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 6 (1961).
43. See discussion infra Part II.E.
44. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
45. Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774, 776 (D.S.C. 2006),
vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom.
Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. 1545.
46. Al-Marri, 543 F.3d at 344; Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Al-Marri v.
Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th. Cir. 2008) (No. 08-368).
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After graduating, Al-Marri returned to Qatar where he lived until
at least 1996.47 According to an affidavit of a Defense Department
analyst, Al-Marri traveled to Afghanistan sometime between 1996
and 1998 where he received training in use of poisons at an alQaeda Camp.48
Al-Marri returned to Illinois, legally, in the summer of 2000
and allegedly registered a business and opened bank accounts
under a false name and Social Security number before returning to
Afghanistan.49 In the summer of 2001, according to the Defense
Department affidavit, Al-Marri met with Khalid Sheikh Muham
med and Osama Bin Laden, who directed him to re-enter the
United States before September 11, 2001 to support terrorist activi
ties by disrupting the nation’s financial system through computer
hacking.50 Thereafter, Al-Marri was alleged to have received funds
from Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hawsawi, who is believed by American
intelligence analysts to have provided financial support for the Sep
tember 11 attacks.51
On September 10, 2001, Al-Marri again lawfully re-entered the
United States with his wife and five children, and enrolled again at
Bradley University, ostensibly in order to pursue a master’s de
gree.52 Over the next three months, he was a subject of law en
forcement surveillance which included surveillance by agents of the
FBI.53 The FBI’s investigation included at least two interviews with
Al-Marri and a search of his computer, which allegedly produced
evidence that he had gathered information about poisonous chemi
cals and retained copies of lectures by Osama Bin Laden and un

47. Jane Mayer, The Hard Cases, NEW YORKER, Feb. 23, 2009, http://www.new
yorker.com/reporting/2009/02/23/090223fa_fact_mayer.
48. See Declaration of Mr. Jeffrey N. Rapp, Director, Joint Intelligence Task
Force for Combating Terrorism ¶ 10, at 5, Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673
(D.S.C. 2005) (No. 2:04-2257-26AJ), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/
nation/documents/jeffreyrapp_document.pdf [hereinafter Rapp Declaration].
49. Id. ¶ 33-34, at 13-15.
50. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, at 5-6.
51. Id. ¶ 14, at 6.
52. Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774, 776 (D.S.C. 2006),
rev’d sub nom. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom.
Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct, 1545 (2009); Andy Worthington, The Last US Enemy
Combatant: The Shocking Story of Ali al-Marri (Apr. 12, 2008), http://www.andy
worthington.co.uk/2008/12/04/the-last-us-enemy-combatant-the-shocking-story-of-ali
al-marri/.
53. Mayer, supra note 47.
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sent emails allegedly addressed to an account connected to Kahlid
Sheikh Muhammed.54
On December 12, 2001, FBI agents arrested Al-Marri in Peoria
and took him to New York City.55 He was held incommunicado in
federal custody at a maximum security prison on the ground that he
was a material witness in the investigation into the September 11
attacks.56 In February of 2002, Al-Marri was indicted in New York
on federal charges of credit card fraud.57 In January of 2003, he was
indicted a second time for using false identification and making
false statements on a bank application.58 After these charges were
dismissed for lack of proper venue in New York,59 federal officials
returned Al-Marri to Peoria where he was re-indicted for all the
same crimes.60 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of
Illinois set a trial date of July 21, 2003.61 On Friday, June 20, the
district court also calendared a hearing on the parties’ pre-trial
motions.62
The most significant of these motions was one filed by Al
Marri’s lawyers to exclude evidence against him provided by Khalid
Sheikh Muhammed and Mustaffa Al-Harsawi, on the ground that it
had been obtained by torture.63 These men, the primary sources for
the information about Al-Marri contained in the Defense Depart
ment affidavit mentioned above, are perhaps now known best as
“high-level” detainees held by the CIA at so-called “black sites.”64
It has now been reported widely, and officially in a report of the
CIA Inspector General, that one of these men, Mr. Muhammed,
was subjected to waterboarding by CIA interrogators one hundred
eighty three times.65 On the next business day after the judge’s cal
endaring order, Monday, June 23, President Bush issued an execu
tive order declaring Al-Marri to be an enemy combatant closely
associated with al-Qaeda, who “engaged in . . . conduct in prepara
54. See Rapp Declaration, supra note 48, ¶¶ 16-20, 25, at 7-10.
55. Al-Marri, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 776.
56. Worthington, supra note 52.
57. Rapp Declaration, supra note 48, ¶ 32, at 13.
58. Id. ¶ 34, at 14-15.
59. Al-Marri, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 776.
60. Rapp Declaration, supra note 48, ¶ 34, at 15.
61. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008).
62. Id.
63. See Brief for Appellants at 66-70, Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir.
2006) (No. 06-7427).
64. See id.
65. Jane Mayer, The Trial, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 2010, http://www.newyorker.
com/reporting/2010/02/15/100215/fa_fact_mayer.

R
R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE301.txt

708

unknown

Seq: 12

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

30-SEP-11

8:12

[Vol. 33:697

tion for acts of international terrorism” and “represents a continu
ing, present, and grave danger to the national security of the United
States.”66 Significantly, the executive order also stated that “alMarri possess[ed] intelligence . . . that . . . would aid U.S. efforts to
prevent attacks by al-Qaeda.”67 The order then directed the Attor
ney General to surrender Al-Marri to the custody of the Secretary
of Defense in order to effect his indefinite military detention.68
On the basis of this order, the Justice Department moved to
dismiss the criminal indictment against Al-Marri.69 The district
court granted the motion with prejudice.70 Al-Marri was then
transferred to the U.S. Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina,
where he remained for more than five and one-half years.71 Then,
in March of 2009, as the U.S. Supreme Court prepared to review
the legality of his military detention, Al-Marri was again charged
with federal crimes, this time material support for terrorism and
conspiracy to provide such material support, transferred from mili
tary detention back to the custody of the Justice Department, and
returned to federal prison.72
B. Al-Marri’s Treatment While in Military Detention
There were no judicial findings of fact as to the conditions of
Al-Marri’s military detention or his treatment during his five and
one-half years at the Charlestown Brig. It is clear, though, that for
the first sixteen months of his detention, Al-Marri was prevented
from seeing or speaking with his attorneys.73 Only in October of
2004, three months after the Supreme Court ruled that enemy com
batants could not be completely deprived of access to counsel,74
66. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Secretary of Defense
and the Attorney General, FINDLAW.COM (June 23, 2003), available at http://fl1.findlaw.
com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/almarri/almarri62303exord.pdf.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Justice Department’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Al-Marri v. Rum
sfeld, No. 2:05-2259-HFF-RSC (D.S.C. June 14, 2006).
70. Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774, 776 (D.S.C. 2006),
rev’d sub nom. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom.
Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct, 1545 (2009).
71. Worthington, supra note 52.
72. John Schwartz, Accused Qaeda Sleeper Agent in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/us/24marri.html.
73. Worthington, supra note 52.
74. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (stating that Hamdi “unques
tionably has the right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on
remand”).
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were his lawyers permitted to meet with him, in the presence of
prison guards, and with Al-Marri in shackles bolted to the floor.75
It is also clear, from Defense Department documents released
under the Freedom of Information Act, that interrogations of de
tainees at the brig were conducted using the same techniques as
those employed at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.76 These in
cluded “prolonged isolation, painful stress positions, exposure to
extreme temperature, sleep deprivation, extreme sensory depriva
tion, and threats of violence and death.”77
In addition, Al-Marri’s lawyers have claimed that for the six
teen months between the beginning of his detention at the brig and
their initial meeting with him, Al-Marri:
[W]as denied any contact with the world outside, including his
family, his lawyers, and the Red Cross. . . . Mr. Almarri’s only
regular human contact during that period was with government
officials during interrogation sessions, or with guards when they
delivered trays of food through a slot in his cell door, escorted
him to the shower, or took him to a concrete cage for “recrea
tion.” The guards had duct tape over their name badges and did
not speak to Mr. Almarri except to give him orders.78

Al-Marri’s lawyers also allege that Al-Marri’s interrogators
told him “that they would send him to Egypt or to Saudi Arabia to
be tortured and sodomized and forced to watch as his wife was
raped in front of him.”79 Additionally, his lawyers allege that the
interrogators stuffed Al-Marri’s mouth with cloth and gagged him
with duct tape, kept him cold for up to eight days at a time for
refusing to answer their questions, and prevented him from praying
and otherwise observing the tenets of his Islamic faith.80
After Al-Marri was permitted to see his lawyers, the conditions
of his detention gradually improved.81 Still, for another ten
months, until August 2005, he was, again according to his lawyers,
75. Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Interim Relief From Prolonged Isolation and Other Un
lawful Conditions of Confinement at 4 n.1, Al-Marri v. Gates, No. C/A 2:05-2259-HFF
RSC (D.S.C. May 6, 2008), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/bd04de8ef937e4ec17_dl
m6ib16o.pdf [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Objections].
76. Worthington, supra note 52.
77. Id.; see also Plaintiff’s Objections, supra note 75, at 2.
78. See Plaintiff’s Objections, supra note 75, at 2.
79. Id. at 2-3.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 4 (stating that “direct interrogations of Mr. Almarri ceased after he was
finally allowed access to his lawyers”).

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE301.txt

710

unknown

Seq: 14

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

30-SEP-11

8:12

[Vol. 33:697

confined to a nine-by-six foot cell, with its single window covered,
and provided with no chair, blanket, mattress, pillow, or reading
material for months at a time.82 This confinement was unremit
ting—“twenty four hours a day, seven days a week.”83 On one oc
casion, he was forcibly restrained to his metal bed, in extremely
cold temperatures, for twenty days.84
From late August 2005, when his lawyers sued Defense Depart
ment officials challenging this treatment, until March of 2009 when
his military detention ended, Al Marri’s confinement was far more
humane.85 The suit was prompted by the lawyers’ fear that AlMarri was collapsing and that the conditions he lived under in the
brig were causing a mental health emergency.86 Despite the suit,
and the change in his treatment that coincided with its filing, AlMarri still was not permitted contact with his family.87 He learned
of the death of his father only a year after the fact.88 Only in April
of 2008 was Al-Marri allowed the first of two phone conversations
with family members,89 before President Obama ended his military
detention and directed that his criminal prosecution resume.90
C. The Challenge to Al-Marri’s Military Detention
Long before their emergency challenge to Al-Marri’s treat
ment in military detention, in fact within two weeks of President
Bush’s determination that he was an enemy combatant, Al-Marri’s
lawyers, on July 8, 2003, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus seek
ing his release.91 They filed the habeas petition in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of Illinois, the district where his crim
inal prosecution had been recommenced earlier that year.92 The
lawyers learned to their chagrin (though not to Al-Marri’s, since,
held incommunicado, he knew nothing about the proceedings) that
South Carolina, the location of the Charleston Navy Brig, not Illi
82. Id. at 4-5.
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 6-7.
86. Id. at 8-9.
87. Id. at 7.
88. Id. at 7 n.5.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Transfer of Detainee to
Control of the Attorney General to Secretary of Defense (Feb. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD200900110.htm.
91. Al-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1004-05 (C.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d, 360
F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 809. (2004).
92. See id. at 1004.
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nois, was the only proper venue for their petition.93 The learning
process, consisting of a dismissal by the district court,94 affirmance
of the dismissal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir
cuit,95 and denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court,96 took nearly
a year.
On July 8, 2004, Al-Marri’s lawyers re-filed the habeas peti
tion, this time in the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina.97 The petition claimed that neither the Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF), enacted by Congress just after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, nor the Constitution granted the Presi
dent the power to hold Al-Marri in military detention.98 The peti
tion emphasized that at the time he was seized, Al-Marri was a legal
resident of the United States, that he was not a citizen of nor affili
ated with the armed forces of any nation at war with the United
States, that he was not apprehended on or near a battlefield on
which American forces were engaged in combat, and that he was
never in Afghanistan during the war between the United States and
the Taliban which commenced in the Fall of 2001.99 For these rea
sons, the habeas petition argued that Al-Marri could not be classi
fied as a military combatant against the United States but must
instead be treated as a civilian, subject to detention only through
the processes of the criminal law.100
In response, the Justice Department produced the Defense De
partment affidavit referred to above and argued that Al-Marri’s so
journ in Afghanistan, which ended on September 10, 2001, his close
association with al-Qaeda, an organization with which the United
States is at war, and his actions on al-Qaeda’s behalf, regardless of
their timing or location, were sufficient to warrant the President’s
decision to hold him indefinitely in military custody.101 The district
court rejected Al-Marri’s argument, holding that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hamdi authorized his military detention and
93. Id. at 1009-10.
94. Id.
95. Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F. Supp. 3d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 2004).
96. Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 543 U.S. 809, 809 (2004).
97. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright,
443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (D.S.C. 2006) (No. 2:04 2257-HFF).
98. Petitioners’ Reply (Traverse) to Respondent’s Answer to the Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus at 5-13, Al-Marri ex rel. Berman, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (No. 2:04-2257
HFF).
99. See id. at 20.
100. Id.
101. Respondent’s Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 19, AlMarri ex rel. Berman, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (No. 2:04-2257-HFF).
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that the Defense Department affidavit provided a sufficient basis
for his designation as an enemy combatant.102 In August of 2006,
three years after President Bush first placed him in military cus
tody, the district court dismissed Al-Marri’s habeas corpus
petition.103
On appeal, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed.104 The majority opinion of Judge Di
ana Gibbon Motz adopted the line drawn by Al-Marri’s lawyers be
tween combatants, subject to military jurisdiction and detention,
and civilians, subject to detention only attendant to prosecution for
crimes in civilian courts.105 Though the AUMF did authorize the
President to detain enemy combatants in the military struggle trig
gered by the September 11 attacks, Judge Motz’s opinion held that
the authorization was limited to persons actually engaged in combat
against the United States, and did not confer power on the Presi
dent to seize a non-combatant living in the United States, even if he
has committed crimes in aid “of an enemy organization.”106 For
Judge Motz, enemy combatant status rested on a person’s affiliation
during wartime with the “military arm of the enemy govern
ment.”107 For purposes of the post-September 11 military campaign
authorized by the AUMF, this meant the Taliban government of
Afghanistan;108 it did not mean the trans-national al-Qaeda net
work. Al-Marri was thus a civilian, not a combatant.109 And as a
civilian legally residing in the United States at the time of his arrest,
he enjoyed the due process right to be imprisoned only through
criminal prosecution in a civilian court.110 This same distinction be
tween combatants and civilians, Judge Motz added, also limited the
President’s ability to invoke his constitutional powers as Com
mander-in-Chief to detain legal residents of the United States.111
In dissent, Judge Henry Hudson did not entirely reject the ci
vilian/combatant distinction.112 Rather, he argued that Al-Marri’s
102.
Marri v.
Spagone,
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See Al-Marri ex rel Berman, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 784-85, rev’d sub nom. AlPucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v.
129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
Id. at 785.
Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 195 (4th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 186.
Id. at 187-89.
Id. at 181 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37, 38 (1942)).
See id.
See id. at 187.
Id. at 193.
Id.
See id. at 196 n.1 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
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alleged training with al-Qaeda and September 10 entry into the
United States to engage in terrorist activities on al-Qaeda’s behalf
were sufficient to place him on the combatant side of the line.113 In
Judge Hudson’s view, the power conferred on the President by the
AUMF to detain enemy combatants extended beyond persons act
ing for the military arm of an enemy government (the Taliban) to
include persons aiding the use of force by an enemy organization
(al-Qaeda).114
The Fourth Circuit panel’s instruction to the district court to
grant Al-Marri’s habeas corpus petition, issued on June 11, 2007,
was vacated by the judges of the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc.115
The en banc court also granted the government’s motion for re
hearing.116 On July 15, 2008, thirteen months after the panel deci
sion, the nine judges of the en banc court issued a remarkably
fragmented ruling.117 Four judges, including Judge Motz, would
have affirmed the panel.118 Four others essentially agreed with
Judge Hudson.119 The ninth, Judge David Traxler, concurred with
Judge Hudson’s enemy combatant analysis, thus providing a narrow
majority to sustain the President’s power to hold Al-Marri in mili
tary detention.120 But Judge Traxler also held that the Defense De
partment affidavit relied on by the district court might not be
sufficient, for due process purposes, to justify military detention of
a person, like Al-Marri, who was arrested at his home while resid
ing legally in the United States.121 Joined by the four Judges who
supported the panel decision, Judge Traxler remanded Al-Marri’s
petition to the district court for further evidentiary proceedings.122
Significantly, Judge Traxler’s controlling opinion acknowledged that
the President could classify American citizens, as well as lawful resi
113. Id. at 198.
114. See id. at 199.
115. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F. 3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom.
Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
116. Brief for Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant
Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-7427 2:04-cv
002257-HFF), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009), available
at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_50553.pdf.
117. Al-Marri, 534 F. 3d at 216.
118. Id. at 213.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 268 (“And I cannot endorse such a view, which would allow the gov
ernment to seize and militarily detain any person (including American citizens within
this country) and support such military detention solely with a hearsay declaration of a
government official who has no first-hand information about the detainee . . . .”).
122. See id. at 276.
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dent aliens like Al-Marri, as enemy combatants subject to indefinite
military detention without trial.123
On September 19, 2008, Al-Marri filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the Supreme Court, presenting the following question
for review:
Does the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)
. . . authorize—and if so does the Constitution allow—the seizure
and indefinite military detention of a person lawfully residing in
the United States, without criminal charge or trial, based on gov
ernment assertions that the detainee conspired with al Qaeda to
engage in terrorist activities?124

On December 8, 2008, the Court granted the petition.125 Then,
shortly following his inauguration, and just after Al-Marri’s opening
brief was submitted, President Obama issued an executive order di
recting the Justice Department to review the circumstances of his
detention and the litigation challenging its legality and to report the
results of this review to him.126 On February 27, 2009, less than a
week before the government’s brief to the Supreme Court was due,
the Justice Department announced Al-Marri’s indictment on new
charges of conspiring to provide, and of providing, material support
for terrorism.127 On that same day, the President ended Al-Marri’s
military detention, directing the Justice Department to reassume re
sponsibility for his custody.128 The Justice Department then moved
to dismiss Al-Marri’s certiorari petition as moot.129 On March 6,
the Supreme Court granted that motion, vacating the Fourth Cir
123. See id.
124. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680
(2008) (No. 08-368).
125. Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. at 1245.
126. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Review of the Detention of
Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri to the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec
retary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intel
ligent 1, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. No. DCPD2009000111 (Jan. 22, 2009), available
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD200900011.pdf.
127. Indictment at 1-2, United States v. Al-Marri, No. 09-CR-10030 (C.D. Ill. Feb.
26, 2009); see also Carrie Johnson & Julie Tate, Combatant Case to Move from Tribunal
to U.S. Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/02/26/AR2009022601892.html.
128. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Transfer of Detainee to
Control of the Attorney General to Secretary of Defense, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc.
No. DCPD200900110, (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/
2009/DCPD200900110.htm.
129. Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Vacate the Judgment Below and
Remand with Directions to Dismiss the Case as Moot at 5, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S.
Ct. 1545 (2009) (No. 08-368), 2009 WL 526212.
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cuit’s en banc judgment.130 Its order cited one case, the Court’s
1950 decision in United States v. Munsingwear.131
II.

THE SUPREME COURT AND POST 9-11 MILITARY DETENTION
BEFORE AL-MARRI

It is probably hard to exaggerate the gravity of the question
presented by Al-Marri’s certiorari petition.132 The Fourth Circuit’s
en banc decision effectively sustained the President’s power to seize
on American soil any person living legally in the United States, citi
zen or alien, and to detain that person, without trial, at least for the
duration of the military engagement authorized by the AUMF, on
the basis of his belief that the detainee is a terrorist.133 If the Presi
dent does indeed have this extraordinary authority, the liberty most
Americans assume to be their birthright is, as a practical matter, a
trifling impediment to a President determined (perhaps under
standably to many people) to do everything in his power to prevent
another attack of the sort visited on the nation on September 11.
Because of the danger to liberty it presents, judicial sanction of un
checked executive power to imprison citizens indefinitely without
trial is also, to say the least, a profound and obvious threat to the
democratic accountability of government and to the active political
participation of citizens that is essential to self-rule.134
If the conception of presidential prerogatives ratified by the
Fourth Circuit effects a radical distribution of power away from the
people and towards a largely unchecked executive, it also raises a
130. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.).
131. Id.; see United States v. Musingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950) (noting that
“[t]he established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the
federal system which has become moot . . . is to reverse or vacate the judgment below
and remand with a direction to dismiss”).
132. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680
(2008) (mem.) (No. 08-368).
133. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 2008). Motz states,
“Our colleagues hold that the President can order the military to seize from his home
and indefinitely detain anyone in this country—including an American citizen—even
though he has never affiliated with an enemy nation, fought alongside any nation’s
armed forces, or borne arms against the United States anywhere in the world.” Id.
134. See FREDERICK O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBAL
ANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 200-03 (2007) (outlining the dan
gers of unchecked executive power and the necessary participation of the public to
curtail it); see also Arlen Specter, The Need to Roll Back Presidential Power Grabs,
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 14, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22656.
See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES
THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 76-90 (1992) (describing judicial un
willingness to abdicate judgment to the executive concerning individual rights).
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set of more discrete but nonetheless vexing questions, including, at
a minimum, the following: if the war powers granted the President
by the AUMF extend beyond the battlefield against the Taliban
government in Afghanistan, what are their geographical and politi
cal limits, if any? Is the theatre of war envisioned by the AUMF
the entire world, including the domestic United States? Has Con
gress authorized the President to make war only on enemy nationstates, as Judge Motz believed, or also on groups, or even individu
als, of his own choosing? If the AUMF does authorize the Presi
dent to wage war on sub-national (or super-national) political
groups, and thus to detain individuals affiliated with such groups, is
it really true, as a majority of the judges of the Fourth Circuit be
lieved,135 that this power applies equally and in the same ways to
American citizens and legal resident non-citizens alike? Are the
processes due citizen and non-citizen detainees in order to deter
mine the legality of their detentions also the same? Does the an
swer depend on where a detainee is taken into custody? Does it
depend on where he is alleged to have engaged in combat against
the United States?
The Fourth Circuit, through the various opinions, addresses all
of these issues exclusively through the lens provided by the AUMF.
There remains, of course, the possibility that the military detention
authority of the President granted by that statute is augmented by
the inherent powers he may enjoy under Article II of the Constitu
tion. This was the position that was urged throughout the Al-Marri
litigation by the Bush Administration.136 Conversely, it is also pos
sible that some powers conferred by the AUMF are themselves vio
lations of the Bill of Rights, as Al-Marri’s certiorari petition
contended.137 Al-Marri’s sojourn in the Charleston Navy Brig
leaves no doubt that an important reason for the President’s deci
sion to detain him militarily was, as the June 23, 2003 executive
order implicitly acknowledged, to interrogate him about his alleged
connection to al-Qaeda.138 Is this a lawful purpose of military de
tention? Is interrogation a more (or less) justifiable goal of such
135. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 276.
136. See, e.g., id. at 247.
137. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-12, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S.
Ct. 680 (2008) (mem.) (No. 08-368).
138. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Secretary of De
fense and the Attorney General (June 23, 2003), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/almarri/almarri62303exord.pdf.
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detention when a detainee, like Al-Marri, is not a member of or
affiliated with the military forces of a nation-state?
All of these issues are embedded in the question presented by
Al-Marri’s petition for certiorari.139 As suggested in the introduc
tion to this paper, the Supreme Court’s post-September 11 deci
sions about the sources, scope, and limits of the President’s powers
regarding alleged terrorist detainees shed remarkably little light on
any of them. In one respect, this may be surprising because there
were five such decisions between 2004 and 2008,140 and the Presi
dent’s position was rejected by the Justices, at least in significant
part, in four of them141 and not addressed at all in the fifth.142 But
the Court’s use of the passive virtues of narrow disposition and nar
rowly articulated rationales assured, perhaps inevitably, that just
about any resolution of the issues raised by Al-Marri was plausibly
consistent with its rulings. The close yet quite fundamental divide
on the Fourth Circuit was a predictable result of the judges’ com
mitment to caution.
Of course it would be inaccurate and unfair to claim that the
Supreme Court’s detention decisions resolved nothing. But a brief
review of the five cases shows how much they left unaddressed and
thus how important the Al-Marri petition was to a resolution of the
central challenges to our constitutional order presented by our gov
ernment’s response to the events of September 11, 2001.
A. Hamdi
Of the Supreme Court’s five significant post-September 11 de
cisions, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld offers the most insight into the Justices’
possible views of the issues raised by Al-Marri’s detention.143 In
Hamdi, a narrow majority of the Court sustained the President’s
power under the AUMF to detain an American citizen captured in

139. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. 680
(No. 08-368).
140. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004);
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
141. See generally Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723; Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557; Hamdi, 542
U.S. 507; Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
142. See generally Padilla, 542 U.S. 426.
143. See generally Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
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Afghanistan while fighting with the army of that country against
U.S. Forces.144
But the Court’s disposition of Hamdi, despite its examination
of both the powers granted the President by the AUMF and the
limits on those powers imposed by the due process clause, is re
markably narrow.145 Justice O’Connor’s opinion, for a plurality of
four justices, read the AUMF to set a firm foundation under a lim
ited and traditional account of the President’s war making power,
but offered no hint as to where the ceiling on that power might
lie.146 And with respect to the due process limitations on the exer
cise of AUMF authority at issue in Hamdi, the opinion defined only
the process due a military detainee who is a citizen of the U.S.,
leaving unaddressed how much, if any, protection might be re
quired for a similarly situated non-citizen.147
1. Hamdi on Presidential Power
Hamdi’s narrowness is a function of the unusual configuration
of facts it presented. Yaser Hamdi was an American citizen, cap
tured in Afghanistan while allegedly fighting with the military
forces of that nation shortly after the American military invasion
which commenced in the late autumn of 2001.148 As a member of
the military arm of a foreign nation engaged in combat against an
invading military force on the territory of that nation, Hamdi was,
when captured, indistinguishable from a prisoner of war.149 His de
tention, in order to prevent his return to a conventional battlefield
in a conventional military conflict between the United States and
Afghanistan, thus lay at the apex of any war making authority con
ferred by the AUMF.150 If an American citizen could ever be de
tained without trial as a war measure, that citizen was Yaser Hamdi.
Thus, if the circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s capture were as al
144. Id. at 517. Justice Thomas “agree[d] with the plurality that the Federal Gov
ernment ha[d] power to detain” Hamdi, thus providing a majority for this assertion. Id.
at 589 (Thomas J., dissenting).
145. See id.
146. Id. (“We do not reach the question whether Article II provides such author
ity” to detain individuals.).
147. See id. at 533-35 (outlining minimum standards for citizen-detainee
proceedings).
148. Id. at 507, 510, 512-13.
149. See id. at 513.
150. See id. at 518 (“We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the
limited category we are considering . . . is so fundamental and accepted an incident to
war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has author
ized the President to use.”).
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leged by our government, it is unsurprising that Justice O’Connor’s
plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer, sustained the President’s power to hold him
for the duration of the American war in Afghanistan.151 And, if
Hamdi was functionally equivalent to a prisoner of war, this power
to hold him was not diminished by the different label—enemy com
batant—that he was assigned. For Justice O’Connor, if the AUMF
authorized the United States to wage war in Afghanistan, the au
thority to hold Hamdi in military detention easily followed.152
With respect to the war power of the President, Justice
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Hamdi was otherwise a model
of caution. It was silent on whether, or for how long, the AUMF
authorizes military detentions in conflicts other than the American
war waged in Afghanistan against the Taliban government of that
country.153 And even with respect to that war, the opinion did not
reach the question whether the AUMF authorizes military deten
tion of alleged combatants who are apprehended away from a tradi
tionally defined battlefield, i.e., outside Afghanistan.154 Nor did it
address whether conduct of an alleged combatant that occurred
before the enactment of the AUMF is included among the acts
against which the statute empowers the President to apply military
force.155 A bit offhandedly perhaps, because buttressed by no ref
erence to supporting authority, Justice O’Connor did offer that
“[c]ertainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of
interrogation is not authorized” by the AUMF.156 But as to
whether this limitation attaches to all military detentions, or applies
more narrowly only to Taliban fighters captured on the Afghan bat
tlefield, or even applies just to those traditional battlefield detain
ees who are also American citizens, her opinion offers no secure
conclusions.
No doubt the application of military force under the AUMF
sustained by Yaser Hamdi’s case would be equally lawful if used
against a similarly situated non-citizen. In this important respect,
the Hamdi decision did clarify the President’s military detention
authority in the narrow circumstances personified by Mr. Hamdi:
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
11. Id. at
156.

See id. at 520-21.
See id. at 518-19.
See id. at 521.
See id.
The government alleged that Hamdi fought with the Taliban after September
513.
Id. at 521.
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that authority applies to combatants captured in Afghanistan after
the enactment of the AUMF, while fighting with the military arm of
the Taliban government, for the duration of the war between the
United States and Afghanistan that commenced in the fall of
2001.157 But beyond this endorsement of a most traditional, rela
tively uncontroversial conception of the power conferred by the
AUMF, Hamdi resolves very little. And, of course, because the de
cision confirmed the President’s authority to detain Hamdi under
the AUMF alone, it quite properly also had nothing to offer regard
ing the scope or limits of any inherent war power the President may
have under Article II of the Constitution.158
Though Yaser Hamdi’s American citizenship did not exempt
him from military detention, it is far from clear whether and in what
respects such citizenship might limit the President’s detention au
thority under circumstances even slightly different from those
presented in his case. Hamdi was decided by a vote of 5-4. All four
dissenters believed that Hamdi’s American citizenship precluded
his military detention. Justices Scalia and Stevens argued that
American citizens are categorically beyond the war powers of the
President and Congress.159 Yaser Hamdi, they argued, could be im
prisoned only pursuant to prosecution, either for federal statutory
crimes or for the constitutional offense of treason.160 Justices Ginsburg and Souter maintained that the federal Anti-Detention Act of
1970 barred the detention of an American citizen in the absence of
a criminal conviction, unless authorized by an Act of Congress.161
The AUMF, in their view, was insufficiently specific to provide the
necessary authorization.162 Thus, if just one of the Justices in the
Hamdi plurality, or their successors, were to view the President’s
power to detain an American citizen differently in some situations
not sharing all of the attributes of a traditional battlefield capture, a
new majority might rely on the citizenship-based limits recognized
by the Hamdi dissenters to qualify the President’s authority in that
situation.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See id. at 517-21.
See id. at 517.
See id. at 559-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 554.
Id. at 540 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 547-49.
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2. Hamdi on Due Process
The likely significance of citizenship-based constraints on the
President’s military detention authority may be even clearer with
respect to the due process limits on that authority recognized by a
majority of the justices in Hamdi. Although Hamdi, because of the
circumstances of his capture, fell into a category of persons that
could be subjected to military detention, he was entitled under the
Fifth Amendment to an appropriate hearing as to whether the facts
that placed him into that category were true.163 Thus, Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion for the Court, joined for this purpose
by Justices Ginsburg and Souter, held that Hamdi was entitled to
appropriate notice of the basis for the military’s belief that he was
an enemy combatant and to a military hearing before a neutral de
cision maker, at which he could be represented by counsel, to deter
mine whether that belief was sufficiently well founded.164 To be
sure, the Government would enjoy many advantages at the hearing
that would not apply in a criminal prosecution. Any evidence it
offered would be presumed true, subject to rebuttal by Hamdi.165
Neither hearsay nor confrontation clause limitations could be in
voked to exclude any evidence from the hearing record.166 And the
role, if any, of Article III courts in reviewing the results of the mili
tary proceeding was left unspecified.
Despite these limitations, the Court’s disposition in Hamdi left
no doubt that the due process clause protects even battlefield de
tainees, at least when they are American citizens.167 But on the
question of whether the Hamdi protections extend to non-citizens,
who are the overwhelming majority of Afghanistan battlefield de
tainees, Hamdi is silent, again because the case could be resolved
without addressing the matter. Consequently, the Government
could, did, and, Hamdi notwithstanding, still does maintain that
non-citizens captured outside the United States do not enjoy the
same due process rights as do citizens.168
163. Id. at 533 (majority opinion).
164. Id. at 533, 539, 553.
165. Id. at 534. Souter disagreed, stating in his dissenting argument, “I do not
mean to imply agreement that the Government could claim an evidentiary presumption
casting the burden of rebuttal on Hamdi . . . .” Id. at 553-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Souter explicitly stated that he did not adopt the plurality resolution on the constitu
tional issues he did not reach. Id.
166. Id. at 533-34 (majority opinion).
167. See id. at 533.
168. See Ari Shapiro, Proposal Offers Specifics on Preventive Detention, NPR.
ORG, (June 26, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105940019
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Because Yaser Hamdi was an American citizen, the procedures
established in his case to promote the fairness and accuracy of mili
tary detention decisions quite likely represent the maximum appli
cation of due process limitations to such decisions with respect to
persons captured while fighting for the Taliban government in Af
ghanistan.169 The Hamdi decision, relentlessly narrow once again,
says nothing about how, if at all, the due process clause applies to
the military detention of persons apprehended in locations other
than Afghanistan or because of conduct they are believed to have
engaged in away from that traditional battlefield setting. Whether
or not citizens of the United States, persons who are neither mem
bers of the military arm of a government with which the United
States is at war nor captured in the territory of such a government
are more likely than Afghanistan battlefield detainees, like Hamdi,
to present plausible arguments that they are not combatants at all,
but are instead civilians outside the lawful reach of military deten
tion. It is thus at least conceivable that if either the AUMF or the
President’s Article II military power warrants the application of
military force to such persons, the due process protections that ac
company this application are more robust than those recognized in
Hamdi. And if these protections are greater for non-battlefield de
tainees, the question of whether they extend to non-citizens cap
tured outside the United States becomes even more salient.
In sum, though the Hamdi decision does recognize a limited
Presidential authority to carry out military detention under the
AUMF and imposes limited due process restraints on the exercise
of that authority, it is, in important ways, a decision whose prece
dential force is restricted to its extremely unusual, particular facts.
Obviously the vast majority of persons detained by the American
military since September 11, 2001 have been citizens of nations
other than the United States. And many have been apprehended
either in locations other than Afghanistan, or because of actions
they are thought to have engaged in outside Afghanistan, or both.
It is probably not surprising then, that there has never been, and
may never be, a hearing convened under the Hamdi procedures.

(stating that U.S. citizens would not be a part of the Obama administration’s detention
system for terrorism detainees).
169. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-35 (outlining minimum standards for citizen-de
tainee proceedings).

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE301.txt

2011]

unknown

NO VIRTUE IN PASSIVITY

Seq: 27

30-SEP-11

8:12

723

B. Padilla
Hamdi is the post 9-11 case that offers the most (however lim
ited) insight into the military detention powers of the President.
However, the litigation growing out of the detention of Jose Padilla
was the most directly analogous to Al-Marri.170 Like Al-Marri, but
unlike Hamdi, Padilla was initially arrested in the United States.171
On May 8, 2002, Padilla was held as a material witness in connec
tion with the grand jury investigation of the September 11 at
tacks.172 A month later, President Bush issued an executive order
designating him as an enemy combatant and ordering his indefinite
military detention.173 As with the similar order for Al-Marri, the
President candidly acknowledged that one of the reasons for Pa
dilla’s detention without trial was his alleged possession of “intelli
gence, . . . about personnel and activities of al Qaeda, that, if
communicated to the U.S., would aid U.S. efforts to prevent attacks
by al Qaeda on the United States or its armed forces, other govern
mental personnel, or citizens.”174 Pursuant to the executive order,
Padilla, like Al-Marri, was transported from Justice Department
custody in New York to the Navy Brig in Charleston, South Caro
lina where his indefinite, incommunicado detention commenced.175
Padilla, like Hamdi, but unlike Al-Marri, was an American citi
zen.176 On the other hand, again like Hamdi but unlike Al-Marri,
Padilla’s sojourn and alleged activities in Afghanistan extended into
the period following the American military invasion of that nation
under the authority of the AUMF.177
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found, on
the basis of reasoning similar to that of Justices Ginsburg and Sou
ter in Hamdi, that the AUMF did not authorize Padilla’s military
detention because it did not clearly overcome the prohibition of the
1970 Non-Detention Act in the case of “an American citizen al
ready held in a federal correctional institution and not ‘arrayed
against our troops’ in the field of battle.”178 Nor, according to the
Second Circuit, did the President have “inherent constitutional au
170. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
171. Id. at 430.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, app. at 725 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S.
426 (2004).
175. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 432.
176. Id. at 430.
177. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2005).
178. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723.
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thority as Commander-in-Chief to detain American citizens on
American soil outside a zone of combat.”179
The Supreme Court, by a vote of 5-4, reversed, without ad
dressing the legality of Padilla’s military detention.180 Instead, the
five Justices in the majority held that the only proper venue for
Padilla’s challenge to that detention had been the federal district
court in South Carolina, because the Charleston Navy Brig was lo
cated in that state.181 Included in this majority was Justice Scalia,
whose dissent in Hamdi was based on his stated conviction that the
President has no authority, statutory or constitutional, to hold an
American citizen in military detention without trial.182
The four dissenting Justices joined an opinion by Justice Ste
vens which found the Southern District of New York, and thus the
Second Circuit, to have been proper venues for Padilla’s suit.183 On
the merits, these four Justices agreed “that the Non-Detention Act,
. . . prohibit[ed]—and the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force Joint Resolution, . . . [did] not authorize—the protracted, in
communicado detention of American citizens arrested in the
United States.”184 Justice Stevens’s opinion added that
unconstrained executive detention for the purpose of investigat
ing and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star
Chamber. . . .
Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of
enemy soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes
be justified to prevent persons from launching or becoming mis
siles of destruction. It may not, however, be justified by the na
ked interest in using unlawful procedures to extract information.
Incommunicado detention for months on end is such a
procedure.185

Justice Breyer, who was one of the four Justices in the Hamdi
plurality, fully joined Justice Stevens’s dissent in Padilla.186 It may
be safe to infer, therefore, that in 2004, when the two cases were
decided, at least five Justices, the four Hamdi dissenters plus Justice
179. Id. at 712.
180. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 451. “But it is surely just as necessary in important
cases as in unimportant ones that courts take care not to exceed their ‘respective juris
dictions’ established by Congress.” Id. at 450-51.
181. Id. at 446-47, 451.
182. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554, 577 (2004).
183. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 464 n.8.
185. Id. at 465.
186. Id. at 455.
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Breyer, believed Padilla’s detention to be unlawful. It is even more
likely that at least seven, the four members of the Hamdi plurality,
plus the three Padilla dissenters, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Souter, who were not members of that plurality, agreed with Justice
O’Connor’s view “that indefinite detention for the purpose of inter
rogation is not authorized.”187 And yet, in neither case were there
more than four votes cast for either of these propositions. And four
being one less than five, the Executive Branch remained free, after
Hamdi and Padilla, plausibly to assert the power to hold American
citizens, arrested on American soil, in indefinite military detention,
without trial, for the purpose of interrogating them.
The proceedings on remand in Padilla amounted, in some
ways, to a rehearsal for the Supreme Court’s disposition of Al
Marri’s appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
reversing a judgment of the U. S. District Court for South Carolina
ordering Padilla’s release, sustained the President’s power to detain
Padilla under the AUMF, holding that “[l]ike Hamdi, Padilla asso
ciated with forces hostile to the United States in Afghanistan . . .
[a]nd . . . took up arms against United States forces in that coun
try.”188 The contrast between Padilla’s subsequent arrest on Amer
ican soil and Hamdi’s capture on a foreign battlefield was irrelevant
because Padilla’s detention, to prevent his return to the Afghan
battlefield, was no less necessary than Hamdi’s had been.
Padilla’s lawyers petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.189 Two days before the government’s brief in opposition
was due, and after nearly three and one-half years of holding him in
military detention at the Charleston Brig, the government an
nounced Padilla’s indictment on criminal charges and moved the
Fourth Circuit to authorize his transfer from military to Justice De
partment custody.190 The Fourth Circuit denied the motion, sug
gesting that the government’s apparently strategically motivated
actions left
the impression that Padilla may have been held for these years
. . . . by mistake . . . [and] that the principle [of military detention
without trial] . . . can, in the end, yield to expediency. . . . [T]hese
impressions have been left, we fear, at what may ultimately prove
to be substantial cost to the government’s credibility before the
187.
188.
189.
190.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2005).
Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006).
Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 2005).
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courts. . . . While there could be an objective that could com
mand such a price as all of this, it is difficult to imagine what that
objective would be.191

The Supreme Court quickly reversed this decision, granted the
government’s motion, and dismissed Padilla’s petition for certiorari
as moot.192 Padilla was subsequently convicted of the charges
against him and sentenced to prison for a term of seventeen years, a
term that he is now serving.193
C. Rasul & Boumediene
The limited resolution offered by the Hamdi and Padilla cases
to the questions raised by executive detention without trial is, as
suggested above, narrowed even further by the fact that the detain
ees in both cases were American citizens. It is possible that the
Justices’ opinions in these cases are largely irrelevant to the fates of
hundreds, or perhaps possibly thousands, of non-citizens held with
out trial in American military custody at various sites, known and
unknown, around the world. It is unlikely, of course, that the Presi
dent could have less power to detain non-citizens than otherwise
similarly situated citizens of the United States. And it is almost im
possible to imagine that non-citizens falling within the President’s
detention power could ever enjoy more rights under the due pro
cess clause than do citizens detained under analogous circum
stances. But, beyond these truisms, any insight from the Supreme
Court on the scope and limits of presidential power to hold non
citizens in military detention must be drawn from those remaining
post September 11 cases in which non-citizens challenged their
treatment by the Bush Administration.
The plaintiffs in two of these cases, Rasul v. Bush,194 decided
along with Hamdi and Padilla on June 28, 2004, and Boumediene v.
Bush,195 decided four years later, were detainees held at the Ameri
can Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Both sets of plaintiffs
claimed that they were never engaged in military combat against
the United States and thus could not lawfully be held in indefinite
191. Id. at 587.
192. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1649, 1650 (2007).
193. Peter Whoriskey & Dan Eggen, Judge Sentences Padilla to 17 Years, Cites
His Detention, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2008/01/22/AR2008012200565.html.
194. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
195. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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military detention.196 And, in both cases, the detainees further ar
gued that their detention and treatment while in detention violated
rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution.197
Because the plaintiffs in Rasul and Boumediene were appre
hended outside Afghanistan, their challenges presented the ques
tion whether, and perhaps to what extent, the war powers conferred
by the AUMF or Article II extended beyond that traditional thea
tre of war.198 Because they challenged their treatment while in
American military detention, their suits also tested, at least poten
tially, the strength of Justice O’Connor’s observation in Hamdi that
“indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not author
ized.”199 And, of course, because the Rasul and Boumediene plain
tiffs were not American citizens and were held at a location outside
the formal legal sovereignty of the United States, adjudication of
their Fifth Amendment claims required resolution of whether and
to what extent they enjoyed the protection of the limitations on
government conduct that amendment enforces. Resolution of this
last question would quite likely also establish the minimum due
process rights available to any non-citizen detainees apprehended
as combatants or held in military detention within American sover
eign territory, since any argument against the application of consti
tutional protections could only be weaker as to detainees with these
connections to the United States.
The Supreme Court’s dispositions of Rasul and Boumediene
did not purport to resolve, or even address, any of these issues. The
reason, in both cases, was uncertainty about the question that is
most basic to the exercise of federal judicial power in the American
constitutional system: whether a federal court can exercise jurisdic
tion over the case.200 In Rasul and Boumediene (as in Hamdi and
Padilla as well, without controversy) the plaintiffs sought to litigate
their claims by seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the venerable com
mon law vehicle, specifically preserved in Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution, for challenging the legality of executive detention.201
196. Id. at 734; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471-72.
197. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15; Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
198. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734 (acknowledging that where the petitioners
were detained ranged from Afghanistan to Bosnia and Gambia); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471
72 (petitioners were from Australia and Kuwait).
199. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
200. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 736; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 472 .
201. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 472.
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In both cases, the government argued that the writ was unavailable
to non-citizens detained at Guantanamo Bay.202
1. Rasul and the CSRT Process
In Rasul, once again by the narrowest 5-4 margin, the Court
rejected the government’s argument, holding that the federal stat
ute conferring subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts over
habeas corpus petitions did apply to petitions filed by Guantanamo
detainees, because the naval base, even if not technically under
American sovereignty, was part of the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.203 The Court’s opinion resolved no other issues. Its
judgment simply remanded the case for further proceedings in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.204
In the aftermath of Rasul, the Bush Administration main
tained—plausibly in light of the Court’s decision—that even though
the Guantanamo detainees enjoyed a statutory right to file habeas
corpus petitions, they nonetheless held no rights, as non-citizens
held at Guantanamo Bay, under the Constitution which a habeas
court could enforce.205 The merits of Guantanamo detainees’ chal
lenge to the legality of their military detention were thus still be
yond the legitimate reach of the federal judicial power.206 This
argument met with mixed success in the lower federal courts and
still remains, as the discussion of Boumediene will show, largely
unresolved.
Despite its view that the Constitution had no application at the
Guantanamo Naval Base, and thus perhaps as a matter of what it
took to be executive grace, the Bush Administration quickly
moved, on the heels of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdi
and Rasul, to fashion a military hearing process of sorts to deter
mine the legality of the detentions of persons held there. This pro
cess established military panels called Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (CSRTs) and charged them with deciding whether the
202. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 472-473 (arguing that
aliens detained outside the sovereign territory of the U.S. cannot invoke habeas
corpus).
203. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471, 484.
204. Id. at 485.
205. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753 (characterizing the government’s view of the
constitutional reach of habeas corpus as limited to the areas in which the United States
has sovereign control, and because the government has formally recognized Cuba as
having sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay the courts would be constrained from enforc
ing the Constitution there).
206. Id. at 765.
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government had a sufficient basis to subject each detainee to indefi
nite military imprisonment without trial.207 The CSRT’s rules,
modeled loosely on the procedures fashioned by Justice
O’Connor’s Hamdi plurality opinion, adopted that opinion’s au
thorization of the admission of all evidence offered by the govern
ment, notwithstanding hearsay or confrontation clause objections,
and its approval of a presumption that all such evidence was true.208
The CSRT system, however, did not require the government to dis
close the basis for its conclusion that a detainee was a combatant
against the United States, or the evidence supporting that conclu
sion, to the detainee, if either had been classified.209 Nor was a
detainee permitted to be represented by counsel at a CSRT hear
ing.210 The definition of enemy combatant employed at CSRT
hearings included any persons who have “engaged in hostilities” or
who have “materially supported hostilities against the United
States.”211 This definition, obviously far broader than the one rec
ognized by the Supreme Court in Hamdi, is notable for its complete
absence of either temporal or geographical limits, or constraints
based on whether an alleged combatant is a member of a military
force or a civilian.
Not surprisingly, the CSRT process sustained the propriety of
nearly every Guantanamo Bay detention.212 Nevertheless, by 2008
many Guantanamo Bay detainees had been released voluntarily by
the government on the ground that they were “no longer enemy
combatants,” a determination which depends on the government’s
having satisfied itself that a detainee no longer had intelligence in
formation useful to the United States.213

207. Id. at 733-34.
208. See id. at 734, 784.
209. See id. at 783-84.
210. Id. at 767.
211. See Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (A) (1)(i) (2006).
212. See DEP’T OF DEF., FACT SHEET GUANTANAMO DETAINEES BY THE NUM
BERS 1 (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2005/d20050831sheet.pdf
(noting that 558 CSRTs were conducted, but only thirty-eight of them resulted in a
finding that the individual was no longer an enemy combatant).
213. See Thomas Bogar, Unlawful Combatant or Innocent Civilian? A Call to
Change the Current Means for Determining the Status of Prisoners in the Global War on
Terror, 21 FLA. J. INT’L. L. 29, 90 (2009).
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2. Boumediene and the Constitutionalization of Habeas
Corpus Rights at Guantanamo
In 2006, Congress sought to overrule the Supreme Court’s de
cision in Rasul by enacting the Military Commissions Act (MCA)214
The MCA included a provision amending the habeas corpus juris
dictional statute, relied on by the Rasul majority, to preclude the
federal courts from entertaining habeas corpus petitions filed by
persons detained at Guantanamo Bay, including those petitions al
ready pending at the time of its enactment.215 The plaintiffs in
Boumediene v. Bush were Guantanamo detainees with pending
habeas petitions authorized by Rasul.216 They argued that the
MCA’s jurisdiction stripping measure was an unlawful attempt by
Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus without satisfying
the requirements for such a suspension specified in Article I, Sec
tion 9 of the Constitution.217
The Supreme Court, yet again by a 5-4 vote, agreed with the
detainees.218 As in Rasul, the majority rejected the government’s
argument that the habeas corpus right did not extend to non-citi
zens held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.219 This time,
though, without a jurisdictional statute to rely on, the Court’s deter
mination was based on the conclusion that the common law writ of
habeas corpus, protected from suspension by Article I, Section 9,
was available to Guantanamo detainees because the Naval base was
under the complete, total, and indefinite control of the United
States government.220 As such, the writ could not be suspended, as
the MCA jurisdictional bar purported to do, without a finding by
Congress that the invasion or rebellion prerequisites for such sus
pension were satisfied.221 The Boumediene majority then went on
to hold that the CSRT process, which had been ratified and made
subject to limited appellate review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit by Congress, was an inadequate substitute for a
hearing on a habeas corpus petition conducted as an original matter
214. See Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1).
215. See id. § 2241(e)(2).
216. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 734 (2008).
217. Id. at 732-33.
218. Id. at 733.
219. Id. at 771 (“We hold that Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect
at Guantanamo Bay.”).
220. Id. at 768 (“Unlike its present control [of Guantanamo Bay] the United
States’ control over the prison in Germany was neither absolute nor indefinite.”).
221. Id. at 743, 771.
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by a United States district court.222 A habeas hearing, the majority
ruled, must offer an opportunity to challenge the government’s evi
dence in an Article III court and to have that court admit and con
sider relevant exculpatory evidence not introduced at any prior
military hearing.223 Because the CSRT system did neither, it was
constitutionally insufficient.224
As in Rasul, the Boumediene majority opinion, written by Jus
tice Kennedy, was narrow, deciding only that habeas corpus review
was available to the Guantanamo detainees and sketching some
minimal requirements of such review.225 Notably, by relying solely
on the common law roots of the habeas writ and the protection of
the writ by the original, pre-Bill of Rights, Constitution, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion appeared to preserve yet again the question, left
open in Rasul, whether the detainees also enjoyed any of the guar
antees provided by the first nine amendments.226 The opinion thus
did not address the relationship, if any, between the habeas corpus
right to Article III judicial review of the legality of their detention,
established by Boumediene for non-citizens held outside sovereign
American territory, and the apparently much more limited Hamdi
military hearing rights available to American citizens held as enemy
combatants in the United States. This apparent paradox provided
an important premise for Chief Justice Roberts’s Boumediene dis
sent. Roberts argued that the CSRT procedures, which he believed
satisfy any constitutional process due the Guantanamo detainees,
must, for that reason, also meet the minimum conditions for a
habeas corpus hearing.227
Perhaps because of this latent tension with Hamdi and the
CSRT procedures, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene of
fered little guidance to the district courts as to the standards to use
in making detention decisions or on the appropriate procedures for
the conduct of habeas hearings. As a consequence, the habeas
222. Id. at 729.
223. Id. at 786.
If a detainee can present reasonably available evidence demonstrating there is
no basis for his continued detention, he must have the opportunity to present
this evidence to a habeas corpus court . . . . [This evidence] would be inadmis
sible in a DTA review proceeding. The role of an Article III court in the exer
cise of its habeas corpus function cannot be circumscribed in this manner.
Id. at 790.
224. Id. at 790-92.
225. Id. at 798.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 804 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
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corpus proceedings convened by the judges of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia under Boumediene have varied
greatly.228 By March of 2011, these judges had completed habeas
corpus proceedings for fifty-nine men held at Guantanamo.229 In
twenty-one of these proceedings, the evidence offered by the gov
ernment was found to be sufficient to justify continued indefinite
military detention.230 In the other thirty-eight cases the judges or
dered the release of the detainee, the first court-ordered releases
since September 11, though the government continues to hold at
least seventeen of these prisoners at Guantanamo pending further
appeals.231
For purposes of the primary rule of law values of consistency
and even-handedness, what is more striking than the government’s
fairly dismal record at these hearings is the variation in the defini
tions, procedures, and rules of evidence employed by the judges
who have conducted them. The standards for determining the gov
ernment’s power to hold a person in indefinite military detention
have ranged from a requirement of “membership in ‘the armed
forces of an enemy organization’”232 (parallel to the definition ap
proved in Hamdi, with the significant substitution of “organization”
for nation) at one pole, to evidence of mere provision, at any time
or place, of substantial support for “Taliban or Al Qaeda forces or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilites against the United
States,” at the other.233 Though the judges have routinely consid
ered hearsay evidence and have been willing to protect information
viewed by the government as secret from disclosure to detainees,
news reports have suggested that judges have differed significantly
in assessing the weight to be given materials not subjected to the

228. Chisun Lee, Their Own Private Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, July 22 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/opinion/23lee.html (noting that the lack of uniform
ity of analysis of the post-Boumediene detention cases).
229. Guantanamo Timeline: Captives Sue For Release, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 7,
2009), http://www.miamiherald.com/2009/09/03/1216218/guantanamo-timeline-captives
sue.html.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Lee, supra note 228 (quoting Judge Reggie Walton’s definition of “substantial support”).
233. Id. (stating that an individual who cooked meals for the Taliban provided
sufficient support to justify his detention); see also Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718,
722 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that the Government “now claims the authority to
detain” these individuals).
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rigorous testing that would be demanded in a criminal trial.234 The
absence of uniform standards has, in sum, required each judge to
fashion his or her own ad hoc rules for habeas corpus hearings, with
attendant costs to the perception, and perhaps the reality, of fair
ness and accuracy.235
D. Hamdan
Of the Supreme Court’s five significant post-September 11
cases bearing on the President’s military detention powers,
Hamdan, decided in 2006, is the least relevant to the scope and lim
its of these powers.236 The Court’s decision in Hamdan did not di
rectly address any aspect of executive authority to hold alleged
combatants without trial.237 Instead, the Court determined that the
military commission charged with trying Hamdan was unlawful be
cause it was inconsistent with both Congress’s standards for military
commissions and the requirements of international law, as adopted
and enforced by Congress.238
In arriving at the second of these conclusions, Justice Stevens’s
opinion for the 5-4 divided Court determined that the conflict be
tween the United States and al-Qaeda was “not of an international
234. Id. (noting the lack of uniformity of analysis of the post-Boumediene deten
tion cases and contrasting the burden of proof applied by judges as “far lower . . . than
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’” and recognizing that “judges have . . . admitted hearsay
evidence, and . . . sealed courtrooms to protect government secrecy”).
235. One district judge has read Boumediene to require application of the Sus
pension Clause to habeas corpus petitions presented by foreign national detainees cap
tured outside Afghanistan but held at the Bagram Air Base internment facility
maintained by the United States in that country. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d
205, 235 (D. D.C. 2009), overruled by Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir.
2010). His decision rested on findings that the United States had firm control over the
facility, id. at 226, that aliens detained there received less process than those detained at
Guantanamo Bay, id. at 227, that any practical obstacles to managing habeas proceeed
ings for Bagram detainees could be overcome, id. at 231, and that, though imprisoned in
a war zone, the detainees had not been captured on the Afghan battlefield, id. This
decision, however, has been reversed by a panel of the D.C. Circuit, which distinguished
the Bagram base from Guantanamo on the ground that it lay within a war zone. Al
Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97-99.
236. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
237. See id. at 635 (“It bears emphasizing that . . . we do not today address[ ] the
Government’s power to detain [Hamdan] for the duration of active hostilities in order
to prevent such harm.”).
238. Id. at 567. In 2001, the Bush Administration created the system of military
commissions to try persons charged by the United States with war crimes “as a toughminded alternative to the civilian trials that the Clinton administration had used against
terrorists.” Charles Lane, High Court Rejects Detainee Tribunals: 5 to 3 Ruling Curbs
President’s Claim of Wartime Power, WASH. POST, June 30, 2006, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/29/AR2006062900928.html.
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character” for purposes of the application of the Geneva Conven
tions.239 This determination may limit the President’s ability to rely
on those Conventions as a source of authority to detain persons
captured in that conflict as combatants. But if this is so, the power
to hold persons apprehended in a non-international conflict de
faults to the governing law of the detaining nation.240 And it is, of
course, the requirements of that law, the Constitution of the United
States, and statutes enacted under its authority that drew the focus,
however limited, of the Justices’ attention in Hamdi, Padilla, Rasul,
and Boumediene.
E. Summary
The lessons to be taken from eight years of litigation, and five
significant Supreme Court decisions, addressing the President’s
treatment of persons captured in the armed conflicts following the
attacks of September 11, 2001, are not unimportant. But because of
the Supreme Court’s commitment to the passive virtues of narrow
resolution on narrow grounds, these lessons are quite limited. We
know, unsurprisingly, from Hamdi that the war-making power con
ferred by Congress in the AUMF authorizes the President to detain
members of the Afghanistan military forces captured by the United
States on the traditional battlefield, as that country became after
the fall 2001 American invasion.241 We know, also from Hamdi,
that the very small number of American citizens falling within this
authorization enjoy limited due process rights to challenge their
designation as combatants before a military tribunal.242 And, prob
ably most significantly, we know from Boumediene that non-citi
zens held in military prison at the American Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, enjoy access to the writ of habeas corpus
(also held, of course, by American citizens and lawful resident
aliens detained in the United States) to challenge the legality of
their detention, though we do not know very much about what that
access entails, especially whether it includes the ability to claim pro
239. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629-31.
240. Id. at 632 (defining a “‘regularly constituted court’ as used in Common Arti
cle 3 to mean ‘established and organised [sic] in accordance with the laws and proce
dures already in force in a country’” (citations omitted)).
241. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004); see supra notes 146, 148-150
and accompanying text.
242. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; see supra notes 163-169 and accompanying text.

R
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tection by some or all of the guarantees assured by the Bill of
Rights.243
The many other important questions about the scope and limits
of the President’s military detention power remain largely unad
dressed by the Court’s decisions.244 Perhaps the most important of
these are (a) whether, and to what extent, there are geographical or
temporal restraints on the lawful exercise of this power; (b)
whether there is a definition that limits the categories of persons
who might be subject to military detention; (c) what constitutionally
mandated procedures, if any, constrain the President’s power to de
tain persons on the basis of their alleged activities outside the tradi
tionally defined field of battle in Afghanistan; (d) whether persons
residing lawfully in the United States, including both citizens and
non-citizens, are subject to military detention; and (e) whether, and
in what ways, the President may lawfully interrogate persons held
in military custody. On these, and perhaps other questions, both
the President and the lawyers and organizations who represent de
tainees, can still plausibly assert just about any position.
In order to resolve the questions presented by Al-Marri’s peti
tion for certiorari, which the Court had agreed to hear, the Justices
would almost certainly have been required to shed significant light
on some, or maybe all, of these issues. Because Al-Marri’s deten
tion was based, in significant part, on his alleged conduct outside
Afghanistan prior to September 11,245 his petition necessarily ad
243. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008); see supra notes 219-223 and
accompanying text.
244. The first of the post-Boumediene habeas cases to reach the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concerned a citizen of Yemen, detained in Guantanamo
after being apprehended in Afghanistan by Northern Alliance forces in late 2001 while
he was serving as a cook for a paramilitary brigade engaged in combat against the
United States. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Perhaps not
surprisingly, in light of the similarity between the circumstances of his capture and
Yaser Hamdi’s, the court of appeals held both that Al-Bihani’s military detention was
lawful under the AUMF and that Boumediene did not require that Al-Bihani be af
forded greater due process protections than those applicable to Hamdi’s detention. Id.
at 875-77. The opinion of the court by Judge Brown implied that Al-Bihani might not
have been entitled even to the Hamdi procedures, noting that “the procedures to which
Americans are entitled are likely greater than the procedures to which non-citizens
seized abroad during the war on terror are entitled.” Id. at 877 n.3. In a separate
concurring opinion, Judge Brown also declared that the situation presented by habeas
corpus petitions conducted under the authority of Boumediene is “particularly ripe for
Congress to intervene pursuant to its policy expertise, democratic legitimacy, and oath
to uphold and defend the Constitution.” Id. at 882 (Brown, J., concurring).
245. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc sub
nom. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (listing alleged
conduct supporting the Government’s detention of Al-Marri); Michael Isikoff, A Terror
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dressed the limits imposed by time, location, and due process on the
President’s war power in a situation significantly different from that
presented by Hamdi.246 Al-Marri was also a non-citizen residing
lawfully in the United States when he was apprehended, had never
been a member of the armed forces of an enemy government, and
was subjected to military detention, at least in significant part, in
order to subject him to interrogation.247 Determining the lawful
ness of his detention under these circumstances would likely have
required the Court also to address the standards for determining
who may be subjected to military detention, the permissible goals
of such detention, and the extent to which power of military deten
tion can be applied to persons arrested on American soil.
Eight years after September 11, light from the Supreme Court
on these issues would have been welcome. It goes without saying
that the power of the executive branch to apply force and violence
against anyone it chooses is enormous. To date, both Presidential
Administrations that have held power since the events of Septem
ber 11 have, perhaps understandably, sought to maximize their abil
ity to use that power against those they perceive to be the nation’s
enemies. To the extent that American law imposes restraints on the
President’s authority to detain persons he deems to be enemy com
batants without trial, it is past time for the judicial branch, which
has the power and duty “to say what the law is,”248 to announce
what these restraints are. For this reason, unless somehow required
by the Court’s precedents, including those precedents standing for
the passive virtues of judicial restraint, the Court’s decision to dis
miss the Al-Marri petition as moot was deeply unfortunate.
III. MOOTNESS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE COURT’S
FAILURES IN AL-MARRI
A. The Purposes of Judicial Review
The American practice of judicial review serves at least two,
and possibly three, distinct purposes. The first and least controver
sial of these is to perform the common law function of providing
remedies to persons who have been, or are about to be, injured by
government action that violates the Constitution. It is this essential
Suspect in the Dock, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/03/17/
a-terror-suspect-in-the-dock.html.
246. See supra Part II.A-C.
247. Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 164-66; see supra Part I.A-C.
248. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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function that grounds Chief Justice Marshall’s affirmation in the
first part of Marbury v. Madison, that “[t]he very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the
first duties of government is to afford that protection.”249 For Mar
shall, it was because “court[s] of justice” were charged with carrying
out this duty that they could properly examine the legality of the act
of an executive branch officer, including even the head of any de
partment of that branch.250
This justification for judicial review is reflected in the limita
tion of the federal judicial power by Article III of the Constitution
to the resolution of cases and controversies.251 And it is this limita
tion which in turn provides the premise for the Supreme Court’s
development of standing to sue doctrine, which requires that a
plaintiff suffer a remediable injury at the hands of the defendant as
a precondition to seeking adjudication of her or his legal claims
against that defendant.252 In constitutional cases, especially, this re
quirement adopts a posture of judicial modesty by explaining the
elevation of judicial power over that of the executive or Congress as
a matter of sheer necessity, as opposed to interpretive superiority.
When tethered to the traditional function of providing a remedy for
an unlawfully inflicted injury, a court’s decision to invalidate the
actions of one of these branches can be seen as a byproduct of the
exercise of the core judicial function, rather than the core function
itself.
The second, more controversial purpose of judicial review is to
implement Marshall’s justly famous claim that it is “the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”253 To
249. Id. at 163.
250. Id. at 165-66.
251. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
252. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
253. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. For a thorough examination of this inter
pretation, see William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DUKE L. J. 1; Gerald Gunther, “The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues”—A Comment
on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3
(1959). Contrary authorities assert that the other participants in the government have a
role in interpreting the Constitution. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEM
SELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 248 (2004) (rejecting
judicial review as the sovereign interpretation of constitutional law); see also MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). Others advo
cated the control of the federal courts through either curtailing their jurisdiction, see
Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to
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the extent it provides independent justification for the exercise of
judicial power beyond that afforded by its necessary place in the
dispensation of remedies, this claim entails an obligation by the
President and Congress not just to obey the orders of courts in par
ticular cases, but also to adhere to the principles declared by courts,
especially the Supreme Court, in carrying out their own constitu
tional powers and responsibilities. Such an obligation does depend
on the superiority of the courts over other branches in determining
what the Constitution authorizes, requires, and prohibits. This is, of
course, a plausible assertion, albeit one that continues to draw con
siderable and forceful opposition.
Controversial or not, however, the conduct of most recent
Presidents has shown considerable acquiescence to the oracular,
law-declaring function of Supreme Court decisions. Even the Ad
ministration of President George W. Bush, whose strategy in the
terrorism cases reviewed in the previous section was to maximize
the scope of unchecked executive power, treated the Supreme
Court’s decisions in these cases as announcing rules and principles
of generally applicable law and shaped its post-litigation conduct to
what it understood to be the likely requirements of that law.254
The Bush Administration’s responses to the Hamdi, Rasul, and
Hamdan cases are instructive. Despite the Supreme Court’s elabo
ration, in Hamdi, of the due process rights of American citizens
only, and the Court’s explicit decision, in Rasul, not to address the
question of whether the due process clause applied at all to Guanta
namo detainees, the Bush Administration nevertheless immediately
responded to these decisions by establishing the CSRT system at
Guantanamo.255
Further, the Administration plainly saw itself as bound to ap
ply the Court’s interpretations of federal statutes in both Rasul and
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 17 (1982), or
encouraging use of judicial norms to curtail expansive judicial review, see Bickel, supra
note 32, at 49-79 (arguing that the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over
some cases and providing a series of factors which may be taken into account in deter
mining whether or not to grant certiorari).
254. See supra Part II.A-E.
255. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Combatant Status Review Tribunal Order Issued (2004),
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7530; see also Memorandum
from the Deputy Secretary of Defense on Order Establishing Combatant Statute Re
view Tribunal to the Secretary of the Navy 1-4 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.
defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; Guantanamo Bay Timeline, WASH.
POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/timeline (last visited Mar. 31,
2011) (showing that CSRTs were initiated for detainees on August 13, 2004, less than
two months after the Supreme Court ruled in Rasul).
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Hamdan in similar situations. After the Rasul majority read the
habeas corpus jurisdictional statute to apply to petitions filed from
Guantanamo, the Administration acquiesced in the right of Guan
tanamo detainees with retained counsel to be represented by such
counsel for the purpose of pursuing such petitions.256 Similarly, af
ter the Court’s decision in Hamdan that the military commission
scheme established by the President was inconsistent with federal
statutory requirements, the Bush Administration immediately sus
pended its use of these tribunals entirely, rather than simply calling
off Hamdan’s trial but persisting in using the tribunals to prosecute
other cases. And, most tellingly, since both Rasul and Hamdan
were based on the Supreme Court’s reading of federal statutes, the
Administration did not respond to either decision by continuing to
urge or apply its own, rejected interpretations of these statutes.
Instead, the Bush Administration went to Congress to seek the
prospective reversal of both decisions by statutory amendment in
the Military Commissions Act of 2006.257 None of this is to suggest
that the Administration’s responses to these cases were correct,
praiseworthy or generous, much less surprising, or even worthy of
much note. The point of reprising these responses is rather to show
that the law-announcing—as opposed to just dispute resolving—
function of judicial review is sufficiently embedded in American le
gal culture to have been largely accepted even by a President who
was, perhaps, most likely to have resisted it.
The third possible purpose of judicial review is to limit the ex
ercise of executive power.258 This goal may be no more than a co
rollary of the previous two, without any independent justificatory
force. Whatever independent weight this third function may pro
vide, however, applies uniquely in habeas corpus cases. Limiting
executive power appears to supply a premise for Justice Kennedy’s
opinion for the Court in Boumediene.259 Justice Kennedy was care
ful to decide that the privilege of habeas corpus, protected from
256. Guantanamo Bay Timeline, supra note 255 (On August 30, 2004, “the first
civilian attorney [is able] to meet with detainees at Guantanamo.”).
257. See id. (On September 28, 2006, approximately three months after the
Court’s ruling in Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commission Act.); John Cer
one, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Examining the Relationship between the
International Law of Armed Conflict and US Law, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Nov. 13,
2006), http://www.asil.org/insights061114.cfm#_ednref4.
258. See AZIZ Z. HUQ, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, TWELVE STEPS TO RE
STORE CHECKS AND BALANCES 11-13 (2008), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/
543341179e6a856b9b_9um6batcl.pdf.
259. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744 (2008).
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suspension by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, is in force at
the Guantanamo Naval Base, without passing on whether non-citi
zens held there enjoy the protection of the Bill of Rights as well.260
Perhaps for this reason, his opinion sought to explain the role of the
great writ in restraining the conduct of the Executive Branch even
on behalf of persons who may enjoy no rights under American law.
Justice Kennedy’s answer to this paradox was to anchor the writ in
the principle of separation of powers:
The Framers’ inherent distrust of governmental power was the
driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers
among three independent branches. This design serves not only
to make Government accountable but also to secure individual
liberty. Because the Constitution’s separation-of-powers struc
ture . . . protects persons as well as citizens, foreign nationals who
have the privilege of litigating in our courts can seek to enforce
separation-of-powers principles. . . .
[The habeas clause] ensures that, except during periods of formal
suspension, the Judiciary will have a time tested device, the writ,
to maintain the “delicate balance of governance” that is itself the
surest safeguard of liberty.261

This argument, to the extent it disaggregates the justification
for judicial review, at least in habeas corpus cases, from the protec
tion of other legal rights of injured plaintiffs and the authority of
the courts to articulate the content of constitutional requirements
generally, appears to rest on an independent need to curb the abuse
of executive power.262 “The Clause,” Justice Kennedy concluded,
“protects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and au
thority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account.”263 If this duty
and authority provides a third rationale for the exercise of judicial
review, it has special salience with respect to the President’s power
to hold persons in indefinite military detention without trial.264
260. Id. at 739. “First, protection for the privilege of habeas corpus was one of
the few safeguards of liberty specified in a Constitution that, at the outset, had no Bill
of Rights.” Id. Kennedy further expressed that “[w]e hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the
Constitution,” and not the Bill of Rights, “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.” Id. at
771.
261. Id. at 742-43, 745 (citations omitted).
262. Id. at 745-46.
263. Id. at 745.
264. Id. at 797 (“Within the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few
exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear
challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a person.”).
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B. Mootness as a Passive Virtue
The Supreme Court’s mootness doctrine seeks to minimize the
inherent challenge posed by judicial review to the prerogatives of
the other branches by limiting the occasions for review to those sit
uations where its exercise is most necessary and thus most justifia
ble.265 The mootness doctrine serves judicial restraint by
withdrawing a plaintiff’s ability to continue litigating a case (nearly
always one seeking some form of declaratory and or injunctive re
lief) if the conduct by the defendant that prompted the litigation
ends before its legality is adjudicated.266 A court’s dismissal of a
case on the ground that it has become moot is thus a corollary of a
judgment, made at the outset of a case, that the plaintiff lacks
standing to sue.267 In order to have standing to sue for an injunc
tion, a plaintiff must be suffering an injury at the hands of the de
fendant that is susceptible of judicial remediation. If that injury
abates, regardless of the reason, before the litigation ends, judicial
remediation is deemed no longer necessary.268 As Professor Henry
Monaghan put it, mootness is “standing set in a time frame: The
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of
the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence
(mootness).”269
Mootness joins a passel of similarly crafted tools of judicial re
straint, such as ripeness, abstention, and the prudential applications
of the standing and political question doctrines, that allow the Su
preme Court substantial leeway to control the context and timing of
its exercise of judicial review. In his justly renowned essay, now
265. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When,
82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1383-86 (1973) (defending the mootness doctrine and the exceptions
to it as serving the Supreme Court’s “special function” as final arbiter of the meaning of
the Constitution by assuring that constitutional issues are addressed and resolved in
proper context); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public
Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1984)
(defending mootness and its exceptions as focusing adjudication on the protection of
rights actually in danger while avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisionmaking);
Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105
HARV. L. REV. 603, 656 (1992) (arguing that the prudential character of mootness and
the mootness exceptions are an effective way of assuring that the decisions of the Su
preme Court give “true and concrete meaning to public values”).
266. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the
“Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 299 (1979) (describing the
doctrine of mootness).
267. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).
268. See Monaghan, supra note 265, at 1383 (urging that the court should not
“waste” its resources on cases in which “‘nothing’ is at stake”).
269. See id. at 1384.
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nearly fifty years old, and in his subsequently equally famous book,
The Least Dangerous Branch, Professor Alexander Bickel coined
the enduring phrase, “the passive virtues” to categorize and cele
brate these tools.270 For Bickel, the exercise of judicial review was
less a duty owed by the courts, either to an injured litigant or to the
American polity as a whole, than a problematic but essential asser
tion of power.271 To be seen as legitimate, Bickel argued, this
power should be deployed only with abiding regard both for the
legitimate exercise of political authority by the elected branches
and for the limits of judicial efficacy in the face of resistance by
those branches.272 Judicial review, in Bickel’s view, must above all,
rest on principle.273 If its exercise were mandatory, principle, he
feared, would yield to expedient deference to excessive claims of
power by the President and Congress, especially in times of great
political stress or crisis.274 Only through the wise use of techniques
that permitted the withholding of judgment in such times could the
Supreme Court conserve its commitment to principled resolution of
constitutional issues.275 Without the “passive virtues” the Court
would be pressured to decide the merits of some cases, especially
those of significant moment, in favor of the elected branches when
a proper reading of the Constitution and laws required the opposite
result.276
C. Al-Marri and the Exceptions to Mootness
Bickel’s warning about the limits of judicial authority in times
of national crisis and political stress seems readily applicable to the
period, still upon us in many ways, following the September 11,
2001 attacks. Certainly the Supreme Court’s carefully limited dis
positions of the military detention cases it has resolved during this
period reflect Bickle’s admonition of caution and restraint in the
exercise of judicial power. But if the Court’s exceedingly narrow
rulings in these cases were warranted, its use of mootness to avoid
resolving Al-Marri’s appeal was not. The Court’s decisions shaping
270. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98, 128 (Yale University Press, 2d ed. 1986) (dis
cussing the judiciary’s use of “techniques of avoiding adjudication” to “limit[ ] each
year’s business to what nine men can fruitfully deal with”).
271. See id. at 128-32.
272. See id. at 192-97.
273. Id. at 130-33.
274. See id. at 131-32.
275. See id. at 130-33, 187-89.
276. See id. at 184-85.
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the mootness doctrine since the time of Bickel’s essay have no
doubt served the prudential purposes for which Bickel argued. But
these decisions have also refused to apply the doctrine in circum
stances where the purposes of judicial review required its suspen
sion.277 Nearly all of these circumstances applied to Al-Marri’s
challenge to his military detention by the President. The Court’s
refusal to decide the merits of this challenge thus claimed the pas
sive virtues of mootness in a case where there was no virtue at all in
the Court’s passivity. The Court’s misuse of the mootness doctrine
in Al-Marri thus undermined the more important value which, in
Bickel’s view, justifies the passive virtues: the Supreme Court’s
commitment to principled adjudication.
Al-Marri’s case, to be sure, did technically become moot on
February 27, 2009, when the Obama Administration ended his
nearly six years in military detention and returned him to the civil
ian custody of the Justice Department to face a second criminal
prosecution.278 Nevertheless, two of the exceptions to mootness
dismissal fashioned by the Supreme Court required the Court to
keep his appeal on its docket.279 And a third consideration, never
formally adopted by the Court as an exception to mootness, but
urged persuasively by Chief Justice Rehnquist two decades ago,
should also have prompted the Justices to resolve the important
questions presented by Al-Marri’s military detention without
trial.280
1. Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review
The first mootness exception excludes from dismissal those
cases in which a plaintiff’s initial suit seeks relief from injuries
which are capable of repetition, yet evading review.281 This excep
tion is quite narrow, perhaps narrower than its label might imply,
because it applies only when the plaintiff whose claim has become
moot faces a reasonable expectation of being injured again by the
same defendant under the same policy challenged in the initial liti
gation.282 This limitation effectively tailors the exception’s applica
277.
278.
tainee to
available
279.
280.
281.
282.

See discussion supra notes 74-85.
Memorandum from Administration of Barack H. Obama on Transfer of De
Control of the Attorney General to the Secretary of Defense (Feb. 27, 2009),
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD200900110.pdf.
See discussion infra Part III.C.1-2.
See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774 (1978).
Id.

R
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tion to plaintiffs who are repeat players, that is, those who are likely
to encounter the same policy or practice again and again, without
ever getting an opportunity to secure a final adjudication of its
legality.
Cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, are
thus usually those which become moot because the injury inflicted
on the plaintiff by the challenged policy is intrinsically of only lim
ited duration, so that the passage of time itself inevitably abates the
injury before the litigation is complete. The most common exam
ples include candidate or contributor challenges to ballot qualifica
tion or other election rules.283 In these cases, any particular
election to which the challenged rules apply will be held before a
suit seeking to enjoin them can be resolved on the merits. If the
challenger is likely to participate in the next election, and thus sub
ject to the rules, again his or her injury is “capable of repetition, yet
evading review.”284
The repeat player requirement is as essential to the exception
as the inherently transitory character of the plaintiff’s injury. For
example, a challenge to a state’s one year durational residency re
quirement for divorce was not found incapable of “repetition, yet
evading review” because of the extreme improbability that the
same plaintiff would be harmed by the same state’s policy a second
time.285 By limiting its application only to those moot cases in
which the same plaintiff faces the prospect of later identical injury
by the same defendant, each one evading review, the Supreme
Court has plainly crafted the “capable of repetition, yet evading re
view” exception to mootness286 to serve the most widely accepted
and least controversial justification for judicial review—the grant
ing of adequate remedies to persons who are unlawfully injured.287
But Al-Marri’s experience shows that a plaintiff’s injuries need
not be transitory to be “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
Far from it. Al-Marri’s military detention was by its terms indefinite
when authorized by President Bush and had lasted nearly six years
when it was lifted, in favor of pre-trial detention attendant to crimi
283. See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 735-36 (2008).
284. Id.
285. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-400 (1975).
286. Id.
287. Id. (noting that state officials would “continue to enforce the challenged [di
vorce] statute . . . yet . . . no single challenger will remain subject to its restrictions for
the period necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion”).
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nal prosecution, by President Obama.288 The harms suffered by AlMarri are instead “capable of repetition, yet evading review” be
cause the actions of both Presidential Administrations show that
they are willing and able to move him from civilian to military de
tention and back at any time, for any reason.
The timing of his transfers—at apparently key moments in his
first criminal prosecution and again in the litigation challenging the
legality of his military detention—strongly suggest that in Al
Marri’s case the Government’s reasons were in each instance
chiefly strategic. But Al-Marri’s right to invoke the “capable of
repetition, yet evading review” exception to a mootness dismissal
did not depend on an ascription to the executive branch of the per
haps less than salutary motivation of avoiding judicial review of its
detention policies. The point is not the President’s reason for
changing the terms of Al-Marri’s detention. Rather, it is his power
to do so, without limitation, at times and in ways that inflict, then
re-inflict, the same harm on Al-Marri, over and over.
Significantly, the Obama Administration’s successful briefs to
the Supreme Court urging dismissal of Al-Marri’s appeal as moot
continued to avow the power to remand him again to indefinite de
tention regardless of the outcome of the criminal proceedings
against him.289 Candidly, the brief even suggested that his future
military detention might even be based on “evidence adduced dur
ing his criminal proceeding.”290 And officially, at least, the Admin
istration held to the position of its predecessor that criminal
prosecution and military detention are separate, independent, and
wholly parallel responses to the threat of terrorism in the aftermath
of September 11.291 The fact that a person is acquitted of criminal
charges does not prevent his imprisonment in military custody on
the basis of the same (alleged) acts that provided the basis for such
charges. At the time of the indictment that brought a formal end to
his military detention, Al-Marri thus faced (and may yet face) at
least a reasonable expectation that he would (and will) be subjected
to such detention again. The Supreme Court should have recog
nized that this expectation brought his injuries within the “capable
288. See supra Part II.A.
289. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 10-12, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct
1545 (2009) (No. 08-368), 2009 WL 526212.
290. Id. at 11.
291. Peter Finn, Administration Won’t Seek New Detention System, Wash. Post,
Sept. 24, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/23/AR
2009092304427.html.
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of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness and,
therefore, within its primary responsibility to provide remedies for
such injuries if they are unlawfully inflicted.
2. Voluntary Cessation
Unlike the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doc
trine, the voluntary cessation exception to mootness does not arise
from either injuries of limited duration or the dilemmas faced by
repeat litigants. Instead, it is directed squarely at preventing the
sort of strategic avoidance of adjudication that the Obama Admin
istration appears to have pursued in the Al-Marri detention litiga
tion. The voluntary cessation exception counsels that a suit that
becomes moot because the defendant abandons its challenged pol
icy or practice in the midst of litigation should be dismissed only if
the abandonment is genuine.292 The measure of genuineness is
whether there is “no reasonable expectation” that that challenged
policy or practice will be revived once the pressure of litigation is
lifted.293 For purposes of voluntary cessation, the plaintiffs need
not show that they will be re-injured by such a revival. The ques
tion is instead whether the defendant is “free to return to his old
ways,” absent final adjudication of the legality of these ways.294
Because the voluntary cessation exception to mootness applies
independently of any continuing threat to the plaintiff, the Supreme
Court has not justified its application as essential to the remedial
function of adjudication that underlies the “capable of repetition,
yet evading review” doctrine. Instead, the Court has explained its
development of the voluntary cessation doctrine by pointing both
to the second major rationale for judicial review, “the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”295 and to the
threat of overreaching government power that undergirded Justice
Kennedy’s rationale in Boumediene for holding habeas corpus ap
plicable at Guantanamo Bay.
The Court’s concerns to safeguard its authority to declare the
law and to prevent official abuse are reflected in its expansive use
of the voluntary cessation doctrine to permit review of the legality
of policies that have been formally repealed, or even replaced by
new ones. Notwithstanding such decisive evidence of official repu
292. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jack
sonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 676 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 677.
294. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
295. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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diation of a challenged policy, the Court has remained suspicious
that the changes might be mere stratagems, designed to foil judicial
review, only to be dropped in favor of a return to an unlawful status
quo ante as soon as the threat has passed. Even the possibility of
this kind of official misconduct is enough to keep a challenge to a
clearly abandoned policy alive if a defendant is formally “free to
return to his old ways”:
A controversy may remain to be settled in such circumstances,
e.g., a dispute over the legality of the challenged practices. . . .
This, together with a public interest in having the legality of the
practices settled, militates against a mootness conclusion. . . . The
courts have rightly refused to grant defendants such a powerful
weapon against public law enforcement.296

An opinion for the Court by Justice Thomas underscores the
Court’s suspicion of amendments to challenged policies if these
amendments are adopted in the midst of litigation and retain any
significant resemblance to measures they replace.297 For Justice
Thomas, such amendments do not represent abandonment of the
challenged policies, but amount instead to their re-enactment. The
Court’s failure to review the original (not the new) policies would
mean that “a defendant could moot a case by repealing the chal
lenged statute and replacing it with one that differs only in some
insignificant respect.”298 For Justice Thomas, this was an obviously
intolerable result.
This application of the voluntary cessation exception to moot
ness underscores the Supreme Court’s jealousy to preserve its au
thority to pass on the legality of the practices of other governmental
actors, even when such practices are no longer extant, especially
when that authority is, or might be, threatened by official abuse of
the litigation process. In Al-Marri, however, the military detention
policies at issue were neither dropped nor amended, sincerely or
insincerely. Instead, the Obama Administration mooted Al-Marri’s
suit challenging his military detention by suspending these policies
as to him and to him alone. To be sure, Al-Marri has to date been
the only non-citizen prisoner taken into military custody while re
siding legally in the United States, arguably rendering his transfer
from military to Justice Department detention a voluntary cessation
296.
297.

W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632 (citations omitted).
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. at

298.

Id.

662.
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of a policy applicable to a class of one. The problem with this argu
ment is that the Administration emphasized that Al-Marri’s trans
fer did not represent an abandonment of its asserted power to
detain anyone else, whether similarly situated to Al-Marri or not.
In fact, the Obama Administration, as pointed out in the previous
subsection, did not even foreswear the authority again to return AlMarri to military custody.299 It is thus impossible to view Al
Marri’s transfer as denoting genuine abandonment of anything ex
cept for the Administration’s willingness to defend this claim of au
thority in the Supreme Court.
The Administration’s briefs to the Supreme Court essentially
conceded this point. They suggested nothing more than that Presi
dent Obama had ordered a comprehensive review of military de
tention policies.300 This meant only that if Al-Marri were
redesignated for military detention in the future, “that redesigna
tion would occur in a much different structure under different cir
cumstances.”301 Nowhere did the Administration disclaim the
power to detain anyone similarly situated to Al-Marri while the pol
icy review directed by the President proceeded. Unless the fruits of
this review, completely conjectural at the time President Obama
suspended Al-Marri’s military detention, were to completely
foreswear the authority to detain persons in his situation, it is possi
ble, if not likely, that they would differ from the present policy only
in “some insignificant respect[s].”302 And with respect to the cir
cumstantial evidence that Al-Marri’s transfer amounts to little more
than strategic evasion of Supreme Court review, the Administration
argued only that the President’s responsibility to protect the coun
try foreclosed such a conclusion: “A rule [the voluntary cessation
exception] designed to prevent manipulation of litigation should
not be applied to considered action by the President of the United
States involving uniquely sensitive questions of national security
and military policy.”303
299. See Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 6-9, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct
1545 (2009) (No. 08-368), 2009 WL 526212 (arguing that al-Marri, as petitioner, is re
ceiving the relief sought (criminal prosecution) while not addressing the question of
whether detention is authorized under the AUMF and the Constitution).
300. See generally, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 6-9, Al-Marri, 139 S. Ct
1545 (No. 08-368).
301. Id. at 11.
302. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. at
662.
303. Al-Marri, 2009 WL 526212, at *12.
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In sum, the Administration offered no answer to the argument
that its mooting of Al-Marri’s appeal fell squarely within the volun
tary cessation exception. Instead, it urged only an abstract to ap
peal the passive virtues, contending that compelling prudential
concerns militated against judicial interference with Presidential
judgments about foreign affairs or national security. But unless the
Administration meant to suggest that these concerns should always
preclude such interference, the circumstances of the Al-Marri litiga
tion far exceeded the outer limit of their application.
3. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Lament: Mootness After
Certiorari
Chief Justice Rehnquist offered a third justification for with
holding a mootness dismissal, one that also applied to Al-Marri’s
appeal. This third exception is for cases that become moot only
after a grant of certiorari review by the Supreme Court.304 Chief
Justice Rehnquist began his argument for a post-certiorari excep
tion to mootness by reviewing the mootness doctrine’s firm position
among the Supreme Court’s prudentially fashioned set of passive
virtues:
If it were indeed Article III which—by reason of its require
ment of a case or controversy for the exercise of federal judicial
power—underlies the mootness doctrine, the “capable of repeti
tion, yet evading” review exception . . . would be incomprehensi
ble. Article III extends the judicial power of the United States
only to cases and controversies; it does not except from this re
quirement other lawsuits which are “capable of repetition, yet
evading review.” If our mootness doctrine were forced upon us
by the case or controversy requirement of Article III itself, we
would have no more power to decide lawsuits which are “moot”
but which also raise questions which are capable of repetition but
evading review than we would to decide cases which are “moot”
but raise no such questions. . . .
The logical conclusion to be drawn from . . . the historical
development of the principle of mootness, is that while an unwill
ingness to decide moot cases may be connected to the case or
controversy requirement of Article III, it is an attenuated con
nection that may be overridden when there are strong reasons to
override it. The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” ex
ception is an example. So too is our refusal to dismiss as moot
those cases in which the defendant voluntarily ceases, at some
304.

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1998).
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advanced stage in the appellate proceedings, whatever activity
prompted the plaintiff to seek an injunction.305

The Chief Justice then grounded his argument for an additional
exception for cases becoming moot after a grant of certiorari as
squarely within the law declaring function of Supreme Court
review:
I believe that we should adopt an additional exception to our
present mootness doctrine for those cases where the events
which render the case moot have supervened since our grant of
certiorari . . . in the case. . . . [Our] resources—the time spent
preparing to decide the case by reading briefs, hearing oral argu
ments, and conferring—are squandered in every case in which it
becomes apparent after the decisional process is underway that
we may not reach the question presented. To me [that] . . . is a
sufficient reason either to abandon the doctrine of mootness alto
gether in cases which this Court has decided to review, or at least
to relax the doctrine. . . . I would leave the mootness doctrine . . .
in full force and effect when applied to the earlier stages of a
lawsuit, but I believe that once this Court has undertaken a con
sideration of a case, an exception to that principle is just as much
warranted as where a case is “capable of repetition, yet evading
review.”306

The Supreme Court has never formally adopted Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s recommendation. But as a case to which both the “ca
pable of repetition, yet evading” review and the voluntary cessation
exceptions to mootness also applied, Al-Marri’s appeal presented
the strongest possible occasion for its application.
CONCLUSION
In defending the passive virtues as techniques of judicial re
straint, Alexander Bickel was not counseling judicial abdication.
For Bickel, the passive virtues permitted the Supreme Court a mea
sure of control over the timing of judicial review in order to maxi
mize its effectiveness when exercised, as it properly and inevitably
must be.307 By deferring the resolution, especially of issues of great
moment and substantial controversy, until passions may cool from
the balm the passage of time sometimes affords, Bickel thought the
Court would be better able to coerce the elected branches to ad
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 330-31 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. at 331-33.
See Bickel, supra note 32, at 57-58.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE301.txt

2011]

unknown

NO VIRTUE IN PASSIVITY

Seq: 55

30-SEP-11

8:12

751

here to the rule of law and less likely itself to succumb to an expedi
ent rather than principled declaration of what the law requires.308
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Supreme Court has
decided five cases which concern directly, or indirectly, the Presi
dent’s power to place persons in indefinite military detention with
out trial and the rights of persons who may be subject to such
detention.309 Prompted by a commitment to judicial restraint, the
Court resolved all of these cases on exceedingly narrow grounds.
As a result, its decisions failed to address many of the central ques
tions raised by the executive branch’s use of military detention in
aid of its efforts to combat terrorism.310 The Court has said very
little about the scope, geographical or temporal, of the military de
tention power, or about the differences, if any, raised by the appli
cation of the power to citizens, as opposed to non-citizens, of the
United States.311 Nor has the Court defined the kinds of activities
(beyond engaging while a member of the Afghanistan government’s
military forces in armed conflict against American forces in that
country) that can properly subject someone to indefinite military
detention or the constitutionally required procedures, if any, which
must attend the military detention of non-citizens.312 Finally, the
Court has not addressed whether the government’s wish to interro
gate a person can ever, even in part, provide a basis for detaining
that person.
Ali Al-Marri was a non-citizen arrested while legally residing
in the United States when President Bush placed him in military
detention, in part in order to interrogate him about al-Qaeda.313
None of Al-Marri’s alleged conduct that provided the basis for the
President’s decision was as a member of the military forces of Af
ghanistan, or of any other nation. Much of the alleged conduct
took place before September 11, 2001, and some of it apparently
transpired in the United States. The full U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit nonetheless sustained the President’s authority
to hold Al-Marri in military detention, a decision which the Su
preme Court accepted for review.314
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
Al-Marri

See id. at 77-78.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom.
v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
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Disposition of Al-Marri’s case would likely have required the
Court to address many, perhaps even most, of the significant issues
it declined to reach in the five previous post-September 11 decisions
which touched on the President’s military detention power. This
disposition would also have been rendered in a context significantly
less charged than the one the Court faced when it decided the ear
lier cases. The Presidency of George W. Bush, responsible for the
adoption of the policies challenged by Al-Marri, had ended. His
successor, Barack Obama, publicly opposed many of these policies
during the last presidential campaign and had announced his inten
tion to review at least some of them.315 These developments likely
signaled at least a modest, albeit perhaps short-lived, tempering of
the political polarization which surrounded military detention dur
ing the Bush Administration. At the least, they pointed toward a
lower risk of serious conflict between the Supreme Court and the
Executive Branch in the event of a decision which limited presiden
tial power. It is even possible that a declaration from the Court as
to what the law is with respect to any aspect of the President’s mili
tary detention authority would have been helpful to the policy re
view directed by President Obama. And there is no doubt that such
a declaration would have been enormously useful to the district
judges who are now sorting out the habeas corpus petitions from
Guantanamo detainees in the wake of Boumediene.316 In Bickel’s
terms, the time for a principled judicial resolution of the questions
presented by Al-Marri’s appeal had arrived.
Nevertheless, when confronted with the Obama Administra
tion’s decision to move Al-Marri from military to civilian detention
in order to prosecute him, the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal
as moot.317 As an application of the Supreme Court’s mootness
doctrine, this decision was indefensible. More important, it funda
mentally disserved the essential functions of judicial review in our
constitutional system: to grant relief to persons who are unlawfully
injured, to say what the law is, and to curb abuse of government
power.
315. See Benjamin Wittes & Colleen A. Peppard, Designing Detention: A Model
Law for Terrorist Incapacitation, BROOKINGS INSTIT. (June 26, 2009), http://www.
brookings.edu/papers/2009/0626_detention_wittes.aspx.
316. See Chisun Lee, Dig Into the Gitmo Detainee Lawsuits, PROPUBLICA (Aug.
12, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/special/an-examination-of-31-gitmo-detainee
lawsuits-722#ali_ahmed (chart tracking the lawsuits of the forty-seven Guantanamo
detainees).
317. Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. 1545.
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To be sure, the Court did accompany its dismissal of Al-Marri’s
appeal with a judgment vacating the decision of the Court of Ap
peals.318 But that judgment did not deprive that court’s majority
position sustaining the President’s power to detain Al-Marri of its
precedential value. Under the authority of that position, the Presi
dent remains free plausibly to claim the power similarly to detain
anyone, citizen or alien, resident of the United States or not, on the
basis of any unproven conduct, anywhere in the world, that he
deems to be a military threat to the United States. President
Obama’s proposed use of the military detention power may never
extend this broadly. But his still pending proposal to institutional
ize some form of military detention, and his decision to continue
such detention indefinitely for many of the remaining Guantanamo
detainees, underscore, however, the likelihood that the power he
claims will, in Justice Jackson’s dissenting words in the most infa
mous detention case in our history, lie “about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausi
ble claim of an urgent need.”319
EPILOGUE
On April 30, 2009, Ali Al-Marri pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organi
zation.320 The maximum prison sentence for this crime is fifteen
years, and Al-Marri was permitted to argue that a lesser sentence
should be imposed and that he should receive credit towards com
pletion of his sentence for his time in military detention.321 The
Government agreed to dismiss the second count of its indictment of
Al-Marri, a charge of providing material support to a terrorist or
ganization.322 Al-Marri also agreed not to oppose his deportation
to either Qatar or Saudi Arabia upon completion of his prison term,
while the government agreed that it would not seek again to detain

318. Id.
319. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
320. See John Schwartz, Plea Deal Reached with Agent for Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/us/01marri.html.
321. Lyle Denniston, Lingering Issues for Al-Marri, SCOTUS BLOG (Apr. 30,
2009, 20:06 EST), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/04/lingering-issues-for-al-marri/.
322. Id.
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Al-Marri in military custody on the basis of conduct he engaged in
before his arrest on December 12, 2001.323
In the plea agreement, Al-Marri admitted to attending alQaeda camps between 1998 and 2004, meeting with Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, the al-Qaeda official, in 2001, and to offering his ser
vices to the organization.324 He further admitted communicating
with and receiving money during the summer of 2001 from Mustafa
Al-Hawshawi, the al-Qaeda member who is also thought to be a
primary financier of the September 11 attacks.325 Finally, Al-Marri
admitted that he conducted research, apparently after his re-entry
into the United States on September 10, 2001, into various cyanide
substances, including their prices, toxicity levels, and commercial
uses, and that an almanac recovered by the government in his
apartment was bookmarked at pages showing dams, waterways, and
tunnels in the United States.326
The plea agreement also indicated Al-Marri’s knowledge of al
Qaeda’s involvement in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States only as of September 21 of that year.327 And though
Al-Marri admitted to attempting unsuccessfully to make contact
with al-Qaeda members by telephone during the autumn of 2001,
the plea agreement indicates no communication between Al-Marri
and al-Qaeda from September 23rd on.328 In announcing the plea
agreement, Attorney General Eric Holder said that it “reflects what
we can achieve when we have faith in our criminal justice system
and are unwavering in our commitment to the values upon which
the nation was founded and under the rule of law.”329
On October 29, 2009, Al-Marri was sentenced to a prison term
of eight years and four months.330 Federal prosecutors had urged a
fifteen year sentence, but Judge Michael Mihm decided instead to
take into account Al-Marri’s eight years in federal custody, includ
ing the five and one-half years he spent as a military detainee in the
323. Plea Agreement and Stipulation of Facts at 8-9, United States v. Al-Marri,
No. 09-CR-10030 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp
content/uploads/2009/05/plea-agreement-al-marri.pdf.
324. Id. at 10-11.
325. Id. at 11-12.
326. Id. at 16-17.
327. Id. at 15.
328. Id. at 15-16.
329. See Schwartz, supra note 320.
330. Carrie Johnson, Judge Credits Time Served in Sentencing Al-Qaeda Aide,
WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/10/29/AR2009102900457.html.
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Charleston Navy Brig.331 Given the time he has already served, AlMarri will be eligible for release in late 2014. At the sentencing
hearing, Al-Marri cried when he told Judge Mihm about not hear
ing a word from his wife and children during his solitary confine
ment as a military detainee.332 He also reiterated the admission in
his guilty plea that he had helped al-Qaeda, adding that he was
sorry for that and “no longer wished harm to the American
people.”333

331. John Schwartz, Admitted Qaeda Agent Receives Prison Sentence, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/us/30marri.html.
332. Id.
333. Id.

